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Abstract 
Between 1960 and 1977, Richmond, Virginia, experienced a tremendous racial 
shift in its overall population. The shift from majority white to majority black brought about 
the city’s first black majority city council, black mayor, and majority black school district 
with a black superintendent. How and why this racial transition happened is the focus of 
this work. Richmond’s racial transition was a part of Civil Rights legislation destabilizing 
the sociopolitical landscape. As federal Civil Rights legislation was intended to create a 
post-racial America, in Richmond, blacks and whites ensured the opposite. Both races 
combined class interest, past racial norms, and future racial aspirations to recreate a 
Richmond that suited their interest. This complicated political, racial, and class-centered 
drama broke a perceived racial solidarity and created interracial political agents that would 
have never existed under Jim Crow. For example, working-class whites and blacks 
politically aligned against their racial elite’s efforts to desegregate public school and annex 
suburban counties. Likewise, the same middle-class black elite who politically opposed 
affluent whites in the early 1960s supported affluent white desegregation and annexation 
efforts. In all, Richmond’s urban crisis was a story encompassing how politics, race, class, 
and space cosmically shifted the racial dynamics of the former Confederate capital. As 
Richmond looked drastically different in 1977 than in 1960, Civil Rights Era racial, 
political, educational, and spatial changes best explain Richmond’s racial transition.   
 
 
 
 
1 
 
 
 
Introduction 
 On the eve of the Civil Rights Movement, Richmond’s white elite dominated the 
city council while maintaining segregated public schools. Yet, by 1977, the once capital of 
the Confederacy, became had a black majority city council, black mayor, and integrated 
public school system. This racial shift in the city’s power structure was the culmination of 
several events that destabilized the urban political arena. Through urban elections, school 
desegregation, and annexation, Richmond transitioned out of Jim Crow Era and into the 
Civil Rights Era. As Jim Crow laws were removed by Civil Rights legislation, urban blacks 
exercised their political power through urban elections and school desegregation. While 
blacks garnered municipal control, through internal class conflict, middle-class whites fled 
Richmond for the neighboring suburbs of Chesterfield and Henrico. Black political gains 
and white flight slowly removed white elites from municipal power. So, affluent whites 
combatted urban blacks and suburban whites with annexation, hoping to maintain their 
political control over Richmond. While race appeared to be the cause of Richmond’s urban 
crisis, it was because of various political agendas that class centered racial groups all vied 
for political power during the Civil Rights Era.   
In this thesis, I explore how the Civil Rights Era did not inspire a post-racial 
Richmond; rather, Civil Rights legislation, annexation, school desegregation, and 
destabilized urban politics and caused Richmond’s political power to shift from affluent 
whites to black professionals. Before 1960, Richmond was a majority white segregated 
city. Residentially, whites dominated three of the city’s four corridors: Northside, 
Southside, and West End. Blacks primarily lived in the city’s core and East End. Jim Crow 
Era white elites used their racial majority to control the channels of municipal power by 
creating white privilege while simultaneously disenfranchising black political and 
2 
 
 
 
educational development. After the removal of  Jim Crow laws, various white and black 
political groups vied for control of the city. After 1960, the apparent white-black dichotomy 
diversified into four major groups, all looking to recreate Richmond in their own image. 
Civil Rights Era Richmond was unique because it allowed self-serving class-centered 
groups to make alliances, sometimes across racial lines, to control the city that Civil Rights 
created in the Confederate capital.  
There were two racial divides and four social classes that sought to control Civil 
Rights Era Richmond. Richmond’s two biggest racial castes were whites and blacks. 
Although mixed-race people, Jews, and Asians lived within the city, this is a story about 
the sociopolitical conflict between Richmond’s largest racial groups. Therefore, the black-
white dichotomy resonates throughout my analysis. As for social classes, each race had 
upper-class, middle-class, and working-class poor. The class monoliths I use for white 
Richmonders are the wealthy and middle-class. Although poor whites were politically 
active, they were not as instrumental in white efforts to deter black political gains. The 
black professional class and working class politically defined black Richmond. Despite 
being labeled middle-class, black professionals were their race’s elite. Therefore, terms 
like black middle-class or middle class blacks refers to Richmond’s black elite.  
Primary sources opened my analysis to the nuances of Civil Rights Richmond. My 
two primary source categories were the “official” and the “unofficial” record. Official 
records, which consisted of newspapers, official correspondences, and federal court cases, 
retold the story from an archival perspective. Racial breakdowns in archival sources, 
through the repeated use of words like Negro and white, led me to believe that race 
dominated the story. Although race rose to the surface of the official record, the events, as 
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well as the ways they unfolded with strange interracial political alliances, convinced me 
that the former Confederate capital’s Civil Rights history could not be explained 
exclusively in terms of racially motivated white economic, political, and residential flight.  
The unofficial record addressed my suspicions about the complexity surrounding 
Civil Rights Era Richmond. The unofficial record consisted of multiple face-to-face 
conversations with black and white Richmonders who declined to be formally interviewed, 
as well as seven oral histories. The interviewees, either lived in Richmond during the 
seventeen years that framed this study, or knew important figures intimately enough to 
provide context for their past actions. Not one interviewee adhered to the monolithic 
concept of black and white. Instead, they referred to class differences between the races by 
where they lived within the city. After cross examining personal letters from citizens and 
city officials with my oral histories, it became clear that race was the outward appearance 
of what was a class-centered racial conflict between different factions vying for political 
control of a destabilized Richmond. Overall, the primary sources introduced how 
seemingly simplified racial conflicts were complicated political struggles for supremacy 
during the death of Jim Crow. 
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Four secondary works examined Civil Rights Era Richmond. Robert Pratt’s The 
Color of Their Skin: Education and Race in Richmond, Virginia, 1954-89 racially 
examined Richmond after the Brown decision. It was Richmond’s Jim Crow society, 
according to Pratt, that brought about “a shameful legacy” of token school integration in 
1960 and re-segregation by 1977. Christopher Silver and John V. Moeser’s The Separate 
City: Black Communities in the Urban South, 1940-1968 discussed how white elites used 
Jim Crow laws to create racial segregation that was physically, politically, and socially 
evident. It was this almost 100-year tradition of physical, economic, and politically racial 
separation that created a Civil Rights Era racial battle over municipal power. Christopher 
Silver’s Twentieth-Century Richmond: Planning Politics’ and Race used spatial analysis 
to uncover Richmond’s long history of structural racism. Urban planning was nothing short 
of elite white attempts to maintain control over Richmond’s changing racial dynamics by 
limiting black residential and economic mobility. John V. Moeser and Rutledge M. 
Dennis’s The Politics of Annexation: Oligarchic Power in a Southern City analyzed how 
Richmond’s annexation drama exposed how race and space became ground zero for urban 
and suburban white political conflict. Through state and federal intervention, urban and 
suburban whites brokered a land deal that suited both interests. Although these four works 
defined Civil Rights Era Richmond as a racial conflict, my thesis will explain why race 
alone limits  the understanding of this era. Although whites and blacks had racial division, 
class interest and political uncertainty combined with race to define Civil Rights Era 
Richmond by its revolutionary shift from majority white to majority black.1   
                                                          
1 Robert A. Pratt, The Color Of Their Skin: Education And Race In Richmond, Virginia, 1954-89 
(Charlottesville: University Press of Virginia, 1992), 5-15; Christopher Silver and John V. Moeser, The 
Separate City: Black Communities In The Urban South, 1940-1968 (Lexington, Ky: University Press of 
Kentucky, 1995), 32; John V. Moeser and Rutledge M. Dennis, The Politics Of Annexation: Oligarchic 
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 My thesis examines Richmond through a lens each of the four secondary works did 
not. While Pratt, Silver, Dennis, and Moeser separated school desegregation, councilmanic 
politics, and annexation, I combine the three to cultivate a better understanding of Civil 
Rights Era Richmond. One cannot fully assess the revolutionary impact of Civil Rights Era 
Richmond without studying school desegregation, urban politics, and annexation together. 
Each of the three issues intimately connected in ways that were not understood by Pratt, 
Silver, Dennis, and Moeser. The racial migration, political discourse, and social conflict 
that defined Civil Rights Era Richmond were caused by the complex social climate school 
desegregation, urban politics, and annexation created simultaneously. Separating the three 
categories hides the nuanced sociopolitical tension Richmond residents and power brokers 
engaged in between 1960 and 1977. Furthermore, this thesis is but a step into using these 
three categories to understand how the former Confederate capital experienced its first ever 
municipal power shift from white to black in just seventeen years.       
Post-World War II urban crises have been linked to economic decline, racist 
agendas, and suburban class consciousness. Civil Rights Richmond fits within post-World 
War II urban historiography, more specifically, the distinctiveness of the non-northern 
urban centers. The three most influential works dealing with post-World War II non-
northern urban centers were done by Robert Self, Kevin Kruse, and Matthew Lassiter. Each 
historian used different lenses to examine the complex social realities of postwar America. 
Economically, post-war urban racial shifts resulted from deindustrialization and economic 
flight to the suburbs. Racially, post-war white flight covertly reinstituted Jim Crow-style 
segregation. From a class perspective, post-war society cultivated a new white collar 
                                                          
Power In A Southern City (Cambridge, MA: Schenkman Pub. Co., 1982), 17; and Virginius Dabney, 
Richmond: The Story Of A City (Charlottesville: University Press of Virginia, 1990), 105.  
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middle-class class, who opposed overt racism and radical integrationalist policies. 
Nevertheless, all three interpretations uniquely tied class, race, and economics into an 
overall understanding of how the suburban-urban dichotomy facilitated post-war urban 
race relations.   
Robert Self understood post-World War II urban crises as the result of economic 
decline. In American Babylon: Race and the Struggle for Post-War Oakland, Robert Self 
tied the origins of black grassroots politics to industrial flight from inner cities. Many high 
salaried middle-class white industrial and white collar workers followed economic flight 
to the suburbs. Industrial flight was economically driven, yet it had racist overtones. This 
mass migration was known as white flight because of the disproportionate amount of 
whites who were able to relocate to the suburbs when blacks were not economically able 
to do so. The Federal Housing Authority did not insure private mortgages to many well-
qualified blacks, leaving them in poverty-stricken inner-city neighborhoods. Despite the 
racist actions of the FHA, Self argued that white flight was the product of homeownership’s 
lure on middle-class whites, not a need to re-segregate from urban blacks. Educational and 
workplace discrimination created the white middle class, making middle-class suburban 
flight appear racially motivated.2  
The allocation of resources heightened the racially charged climate between urban 
blacks and the newly suburban white middle class. Self identified that black grassroots 
politics gained traction when urban tax revenue was redistributed to suburban business 
interest. New highways, property tax breaks and suburban land development resulted from 
urban blacks having little-to-no influence over the use of public funds. This prevented 
                                                          
2 Robert O. Self, American Babylon: Race And The Struggle For Postwar Oakland (Princeton, N.J. Princeton 
University Press, 2003).  
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blacks from obtaining high-paying municipal jobs and receiving quality public services 
such as transportation, welfare, and public schooling.3   
Kevin M. Kruse described post-World War II urban crises as the byproduct of racist 
whites seeking protection from the Civil Rights movement. Kruse’s White Flight: Atlanta 
and the Making of Modern Conservatism illuminated that white flight, consumer rights 
platforms, and economic relocation systematically reinstituted Jim Crow Era white 
supremacy in Atlanta. White capitalists and city planners put their disdain into action by 
using social class, space, and municipal politics to create geographic separation from 
liberal minded blacks wishing to use Civil Rights legislation to establish municipal control 
over their built environment. Because white Atlantans resisted Civil Rights change, they 
challenged federal authority by creating “modern conservatism.” This conservatism 
protected their race-centered agendas under the guise of economic rights. These economic 
rights allowed whites to separate from integration through financial exclusion. Instead of 
integrating public schools, for example, white Atlantans would relocate to newly developed 
areas where housing markets prevented most blacks from infiltrating. Since Jim Crow laws 
legislated blacks to poverty, modern conservatives reinstituted Jim Crow by setting 
financial limitations on newly enfranchised black Atlantans.4 
In Kruse’s Atlanta, white racial solidarity was shattered when one social faction 
secured enough political currency to avoid federal Civil Rights legislation. The white 
working class, who supported Jim Crow Era white supremacy in the workplace, public 
schools, and civil society, were betrayed by their elites who used housing markets, 
                                                          
3 Self, American Babylon, 136.  
4 Kevin Michael Kruse, White Flight: Atlanta And The Making Of Modern Conservatism (Princeton, N.J: 
Princeton University Press, 2005).  
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preparatory schools, and zoning ordinances to separate from federal integration policies. 
As blacks filled the urban arena, Jim Crow policies and procedures waned, forcing whites 
who could not relocate to deal with integration by sharing municipal power and resources 
with black residents. Kruse’s political and racial analysis lacked perspective on one of the 
most important municipal services white and black Atlantans had to share: public 
education. Matthew Lassiter came along three years later and used class to analyze 
Atlanta’s racial strife over public education.5  
Matthew Lassiter described post-World War II urban crises as class-centered 
movements resulting from the deindustrialized economy creating middle-class, white racial 
innocence. The Silent Majority: Suburban Politics in the Sunbelt South distanced the field 
from Kruse’s racial view of the post-war urban South. Rather, Lassiter used school 
desegregation to highlight how the white-collar economy created the “silent majority;” or 
moderate whites who used suburbia to escape the economic and racial problems of the 
inner city. To Lassiter, the silent majority chose the middle ground between black activists 
and racist white elites. The middle ground correlated with their position in the emerging 
deindustrialized white-collar economy. Middle-class whites were not blue collar workers; 
neither were they corporate elites. They were their own separate social class who wished 
to keep their economic and social rights at the expense of the blacks that the New Deal 
liberalism forgot. White middle-class economic development created a class identity that 
required a matching political platform. This economic and identifiably white social class 
                                                          
5 Kruse, White Flight, 8. 
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resisted the radicalism of liberal reformers and staunch racism from conservatives, as both 
threatened the stability of the white, middle-class silent majority.6  
 Middle-class moderates believed in both economic segregation and racial 
integration. Although Lassiter alluded to this position being disingenuous, suburban whites 
wished to see the end of racial segregation. Instead, they believed economics should have 
been the standard to achieve the liberal policies of integration. This position ignored that 
structural racism prevented many blacks from ever becoming middle class. Nevertheless, 
school desegregation violated the economic protection that they believed was colorblind. 
However, moderates disapproved of legalized racial segregation. The overt racism of the 
past pushed them to the center, as many suburbanites were New Deal liberals who 
disagreed with conservative opposition to liberal economic policies that created middle-
class suburbia. Middle-class whites believed economics to be the determining factor in 
social policy, not extremism on both sides of the aisle.7  
 My thesis contributes to post-World War II urban historiography because it 
illuminates how both race and class created the urban crisis in Richmond, Virginia. While 
economics played a pivotal role in the federal court proceedings that facilitated the urban 
crisis, ultimately, race and class conflict dominated the racial shift. Similar to Kruse’s 
Atlanta, white oligarchs used space and politics to maintain their Jim Crow-style racial 
order over Richmond. Similar to Lassiter’s Charlotte, class consciousness divided 
segregation era elites and suburban moderates over how the post-war urban political arena 
should operate. However, Richmond’s race and class structures add complexity to Kruse 
                                                          
6 Matthew D. Lassiter, The Silent Majority: Suburban Politics In The Sunbelt South (Princeton, N.J: Princeton 
University Press, 2006). 
7 Lassiter, The Silent Majority, 120.  
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and Lassiter’s examples because whites and blacks were not united on racial or class 
interests. Rather, Richmond had four factions, segregation era white elites, black 
professionals, working-class blacks, and suburban whites, all vying to remake the post-Jim 
Crow Richmond according to their class interests. Civil Rights legislation forced each side 
to make allies with the other race out of convenience, refuting the narrative of urban politics 
having stanched racial division.   
 Chapter 1 focuses on the origins of Richmond’s black political emergence between 
1960 and 1966. In just six years, Richmond’s public school system and population shifted 
from majority white to majority black, with three black councilmen serving at once. This 
shift resulted from two NAACP lawsuits against the Richmond City School Board and the 
mobilization of black voters in city council elections. The two school desegregation 
lawsuits forced city officials to begin integration in 1960. Political mobilization came from 
black professionals engaging working-class blacks into municipal politics. This created 
racial solidarity at the polls, as working-class blacks politically empower their professional 
leadership. Black voting power increased in stages. Black voters went from controling the 
political careers of white politicians to voting segregation-era black elites into office. Injust 
four elections, black Richmonders quickly ascended from an underrepresented voting 
constituency to one of the most important voting constituencies in city elections.    
 Chapter 2, the Middle Years (1967-1970), details how white class division, and the 
changing nature of black politics, complicated Richmond’s racial transition. By 1967, 
young energetic black politican Henry Marsh III used urban redevelopment to remove 
segregation era black leadership from power, all while heading black Richmond’s liberal 
regime. As black politics reached new heights under Marsh, white politics experienced 
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class breakdowns. Urban and suburban whites disagreed on how to deal with black political 
advancement. Suburban whites wanted exclusion from Civil Rights Richmond, as they 
recreated racial segregation in surrounding counties. Since white flight and black politics 
loosened elite white political control, annexation surfaced as a central issue. Urban and 
suburban whites clashed because neither side wished to compromise its original position. 
Although a land deal was eventually brokered, annexation conflict weakened white racial 
solidarity. Disagreements over the minutia, political impact, and aftermath of the 1969 
annexation set up two federal Civil Rights cases that captivated the city throughout the 
1970s.  
Both urban and suburban whites worked to create their differing visions of the 
metropolitan area. Councilmen Phil Bagley, James Wheat, and City Manager Alan Kiepper 
worked with suburban officials Irvin Horner, Frederick F. Dietsch, and Melvin Burnet to 
broker an annexation that served both parties’ interests. The land deal maintained a white 
majority city council and urban population while furthering the geographic gap between 
the suburbs and the city. This deal not only created Civil Rights issues within urban voting, 
it sparked controversy within school desegregation. As federal forces, under Judge Robert 
Merhige, progressively desegregated city schools by 1970, suburbanites confronted the 
same Civil Rights education reform that white flight and municipal borders previously 
excluded them from.  
 Chapter 3 uses two landmark federal cases to complete this study. First, the 
aftermath of grassroots suburban resistance to busing and annexation inspired the Bradley 
v. Richmond School Board case. The goal was to place black professionals in charge of a 
fully integrated public school system. However, Bradley evolved into a complete 
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consolidation of urban and suburban public schools. This put middle-class blacks in 
opposition to suburban whites. Strange political alliances arose as urban whites and black 
elites favored consolidation. School consolidation allowed white elites to politically 
control suburbia while black elites controlled the public school system. Suburban white 
and working-class black opposition united them against the consolidation. Both sides had 
little to no interest in racially mixing their schools across municipal boundaries. In the end, 
suburban whites and working-class blacks victoriously prevented the school consolidation, 
but Richmond’s public schools experienced full city-wide busing in 1974.  
Second, the Holt v City of Richmond, Virginia case, exposed how class identity 
broke previously perceived racial solidarity. Working-class black leader Curtis Holt Sr., 
sued the city council for violating the Voting Rights Act of 1965 through the 1969 
annexation. The Civil Rights movement caused dissent among black Richmonders over 
which class should control the city’s power structure. To Holt, the annexation, which was 
supported by black professionals, prevented him and working-class blacks from infiltrating 
the city’s power structure. Black elites and white elites partnered to bring about the demise 
of the Holt case. Stopping Holt removed federal attention from elite white efforts to control 
the city council. To black professionals, Holt was a tool of the working-class who 
overstepped his bounds by trying to usurp the politically powerful black elite.  
The strange alliances did not stop with white and black elites siding against Curtis 
Holt. Holt received financial support from suburban white organizations like the Broad 
Rock Council of Civil Associations and lawyer Cabell Venable. Both suburbanites and 
Venable wished to de-annex the 44,000 white suburbanites back into the class-centered 
white suburbs of Chesterfield County. In the end, Richmond kept the annexed land, but the 
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case facilitated white flight. Bradley and Holt finished the racial transition started in 1960. 
Richmond’s population, public school system, and municipal power structure shifted from 
white to black. The diversity of black political interest changed greatly, as the Civil Rights 
Era presented blacks with the political opportunity to break ranks with each other. 
However, what remained unchanged was that black elites retained control of black politics 
in Richmond, despite Holt’s lawsuit being one of two major events to complete the white 
transition out of the city. As black elites gained control of the power structure, they became 
less responsive to the constituency that ignited their political ascendancy in 1960.  
Today, Richmond residents’ intertwine race and class because Civil Rights 
legislation did not remove race from Richmond’s political fabric. Geographic titles or 
defined space carry race and class connotations, more now than they ever have throughout 
the Richmond metropolitan area. Growing up in Chesterfield County, I noticed how black 
and white suburban parents used race and class epitaphs to make sense of their racial 
uncertainties. Terms like ghetto, urban, inner-city, unsafe, and sketchy were used to 
classify urban spaces as black. When my friends and I heard these words from adults, we 
understood the race and class connotations they alluded to. If the area, such as Richmond 
city, was majority black, it was usually poor and unsafe; thus, it should be avoided by 
children of privilege.  
Conversely, my parents conditioned me to never classify or be classified with 
majority black spaces, while always identifying with white identified space. In modern-
day Richmond, both races understand black as poverty stricken, violent, and uneducated, 
while seeing white as wealthy, safe, and pleasant to be around. Ideas about race and class 
being intimately connected through defined space resulted from the Civil Rights 
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movement’s failure to create a post-racial Richmond. Richmonders found new ways to 
express their deepest insecurities about racial differences. My thesis describes how the 
Richmond metropolitan area I grew up in during the 1990s and early 2000s, came directly 
from the racial uncertainties of the 1960s and 1970s. My childhood interaction with 
suburban race and class concepts was not abnormal, as my friends from college, who came 
from metropolitan areas throughout the South, shared with me their similar interactions 
with race and class being staunchly defined by space. Thus, our experiences should be 
studied, through Richmond’s urban crisis, to understand how the connection between race, 
class, and space came about and is still prevalent in post-Civil Rights America.  
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Chapter 1: 1960-1966 
In the Civil Rights Era, the former Confederate capital experienced a cosmic racial 
shift in its power structure: city council and public schools. Starting with Brown v. Board 
of Education of Topeka, Kansas and ending with the Fair Housing Act of 1968, Civil Rights 
was not just a movement, but as Gavin Wright said, it was a revolution because it radically 
changed how Americans understood and dealt with the political implications of race. 
Although the Civil Rights legislation should have created a post-racial Richmond, whites 
and blacks ensured the opposite. As race transitioned from overtly codified to covert 
political currency, both whites and blacks continuously used racial politics to achieve their 
vision for Civil Rights Richmond. The three categories that best explain Civil Rights Era 
Richmond are electoral politics, school desegregation, and annexation attempts. Between 
1960 and 1966, the city transitioned from a 68% white populated city, with an all-white 
city council and majority white public school system, to a 50/50 white-black population, 
three black city councilmen, and a majority black public school student population. This 
racial shift came at the helm of urban blacks using Civil Rights Era electoral advances and 
school desegregation to rebuild their political and educational landscape while whites saw 
Civil Rights changes as the means to either retain urban power or reinstitute racial 
separation via white flight.8 
 
 
                                                          
8 Gavin Wright, Sharing the Prize: The Economics of the Civil Rights Revolution in the American South 
(Harvard University Press, 2013), 4; Benjamin Campbell, Richmond’s Unhealed History (Brandylane 
Publishers, Inc, 2012), 159-169; and Peter K. Eisinger, The Politics of Displacement: Racial and Ethnic 
Transition in Three American Cities, (Academic Press, London, 1980), 5. I am defining Richmond’s Civil 
Rights Era as the years between 1960 and 1977.  
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Electoral Politics  
Why electoral politics and what does it tell us about Civil Rights Era Richmond? 
The racial shift in Richmond’s city council campaigns illuminate, more than the 
administrations that were elected, the social impact of black electoral increases, as well as 
the class complexities that only post-Jim Crow America could expose. Pre-1960 elections 
centered on white voters electing prominent conservative white businessmen to the city 
council every two years. Post-1960 Richmond consisted of black voters helping elect 
blacks and liberal whites to the city council. This happened at the behest of middle and 
working-class blacks creating a new political landscape. However, this race-based 
partnership had limits, as Civil Rights change meant different things to both sides. As 
blacks carved their niche in electoral politics, professional and working-class black racial 
ties were tested by internal and external forces, culminating in black professionals changing 
their leadership methods to maintain their racialized voting bloc, which gave them political 
power.  
Civil Rights changes in Richmond began, not with Brown, but with local electoral 
politics. The most evident aspect of Richmond’s power shift was the city council elections 
between 1960 and 1966. Prior to 1960, affluent whites dominated the city council. Blacks 
had minimal impact on the city council as well as council elections. There had been only 
one post-Reconstruction black city councilman elected prior to 1960. This was in large part 
due to state-sponsored measures and the Byrd Machine keeping black voting below thirty 
percent. However, in 1960, this trend changed. As Virginia’s Jim Crow Era conservative 
power structure was challenged by the liberal-minded Young Turks in the early 1960s, 
Richmond’s white power structure came under attack as well. The black population and its 
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voter participation rose above thrity percent between 1960 and 1966, enabling blacks to 
use citywide voting to help elect three black councilmen, with one becoming the Vice 
Mayor.9  
Racial solidarity, through urban redevelopment, politically mobilized black 
Richmond by 1960. The first issue was housing displacement. In 1955 and 1957, Richmond 
experienced physical redevelopment through the construction of the Richmond-Petersburg 
Turnpike and Interstate 95. These projects were purposefully and masterfully designed to 
displace over 30,000 citizens, transforming downtown Richmond into a major shopping 
district. Black homeowners made up 20,000 of the 30,000 displaced residents, most coming 
from Jackson Ward, Richmond’s oldest and most prominent black neighborhood. There 
was a vacant valley located four blocks north of Jackson Ward that could have “better” 
supported the highway. However, the 1955 city council led by future Mayor Phil Bagley 
and the City Planning Commission built the interstate and turnpike through Jackson Ward. 
Despite opposition from the Carver Displacement League, headed by black Mortician 
Oliver P. Chiles, the construction was approved by the Richmond Redevelopment and 
Housing Authority. Since most blacks could not purchase new homes in the city’s highly 
                                                          
9 J. Harvey Wilkerson III, Harry Byrd and the Changing Face of Virginia Politics (University of Virginia 
Press, 1968), 20-61. Harry Byrd was a Winchester aristocrat who owned a majority of Virginia’s media 
outlets, including the Richmond News Leader. Byrd used political ties called “The Byrd Machine,” which 
was a collection of local, state, and national politicians, to maintain conservative white supremacist control 
over Virginia politics. His influence was felt more in Virginia’s Southside and Valley regions, controlling 
who ran and won local, statewide, and national offices. However, as urban areas like Richmond gained more 
importance through economic expansion and federal investment, Byrd suppressed attempts to remove power 
from affluent whites within his circle. The Young Turks were college educated liberal politicians who 
challenged the conservative Byrd Machine for political supremacy in Virginia during the 1950s and 60s. 
Most were University of Virginia trained lawyers and politicians from the Richmond and Roanoke area. See 
Wilkerson 263-97, for more information on the statewide power struggle and how it resonated during Civil 
Rights Era Richmond.  
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racist and competitive real estate market, many became public housing residents in the 
city’s East End corridor.  
Segregation became an issue that united black Richmonders. Urban blacks were 
dissatisfied with white-owned downtown businesses charging similar prices for dissimilar 
services. This frustration resulted in the Thalhimer’s Department store boycott from April 
until Christmas of 1960. To Virginia Union professor Dr. Raymond Pierre Hylton, the 
boycott was meant to economically and socially “send repercussions throughout the 
South.” Black Richmonders were not as concerned with bankrupting downtown business, 
as they were about establishing “human dignity” in their changing environment. 
Residential displacement and segregation stripped blacks of their dignity because it 
perpetuated generational black disenfranchisement. Housing displacement and segregation 
not only inspired Richmond blacks to become politically active on the local level, it gave 
them a cause to politically mobilize around.10  
The partnership between black religious and political leadership created the 
foundation for a political coalition between the professional and working classes. Although 
men like Dr. Hylton and the Thalhimers’ boycott foot soldiers shared the same race, class 
separated them. Black electoral ascendancy came when blacks worked together across 
class boundaries; however, this was done by the only other commonality black 
                                                          
10 Christopher Silver, Twentieth-Century Richmond: Planning, Politics, and Race (Knoxville: University of 
Tennessee Press, 1984), 217-230; Curt Aurty, “Civil Rights Movement Hits Richmond Room at Thalhimers;” 
World Now, (February 22, 2010); and Zack Brown, “The Sit-In Effect.” Mapping American History, Seminar 
at the University of Richmond. Silver charted the beginning of white flight to Chesterfield and Henrico 
Counties during the urban redevelopment late 1950’s. Middle-class white residents were displaced in large 
numbers, as the council organized Richmond to fit industrial flight to Southern cities. Most of Jackson Ward 
was labeled a slum by the Richmond Redevelopment Housing Authority, thus it was fair game for 
redevelopment. John V. Moeser suggested that local banks refused to extend redevelopment loans to Jackson 
Ward residents. This led to exterior deterioration, giving city officials the ammunition to demolish it for 
Interstate 95, which is still there today.  
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Richmonders collectively shared: religion. Virginia Union professor William Thornton 
began the Richmond Civic Council in 1958 later renamed the Crusade for Voters in 1960. 
This voter organization operated under the leadership of lawyers, businessmen, academics, 
and doctors like George A. Pannell and Milton Randolph. The Crusade connected with the 
working-class majority through the Baptist Ministers Conference of Greater Richmond and 
Vicinity. The “black Baptist leadership,” under Dr. Robert Taylor, worked side-by-side 
with the Crusade to electorally mobilize working-class black voters. For black 
Richmonders, the Baptist church was “dominant in the community.” Any political agenda 
or leader who wished to capitalize on black numerical strength did so through the church. 
Organized funding through First Baptist Church, Fourth Baptist Church, Sixth Baptist 
Church, Baker PTA, and the Fairmount Teachers Club helped the Crusade pay voter 
registration fees. Collectively, the church cemented the bonds that class separated. Both 
sides did not necessarily like each other, however, in the face of racial discrimination, 
politicians and church leadership partnered to control the outlook of Civil Rights Richmond 
through city council elections. For professional blacks, this meant being political leaders, 
and for working-class blacks, this meant supporting black leadership in the face of urban 
redevelopment and economic inequality.11   
The Crusade increased black electoral strength by changing the nature of black 
voting. Crusade leadership switched black voting from the single-shot method to a full-
slate approach. Single-shot allowed voting organizations to allocate all its votes to just one 
candidate. This ensured the candidacy of one councilman while neglecting other 
                                                          
11 Crusade for Voters Papers, list of “Individual Contributors” and “Contributors from Organizations;” 
“Open Letter” 1960-1961 Richmond Crusade for Voters Archives, M 306 Box 1, James Branch Cabell 
Library, Virginia Commonwealth University; and Interview with Reverend Benjamin Campbell, January 6, 
2016.  
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candidates. Full-slate voting allowed the organization to nominate up to nine candidates at 
once. Utilizing the full-slate method gave the Crusade the best chance at controlling the 
overall outcome of the election. Instead of electing one councilman, the organization could 
elect as many councilmen as its voting numbers allowed. The full-slate approach showed 
that the Crusade was priming to impact all nine available seats, not just one.12  
The Crusade’s work did not go unnoticed by white politicians. By June of 1960, 
the Crusade registered over 14,000 black voters for the upcoming election. This was the 
most black voters Richmond had for a municipal election to date, not to mention it 
represented over half of the overall voting population. The Crusade’s success in registering 
14,000 black voters allowed them to issue all twenty-two white candidates a questionnaire 
about how each of them would serve the expanded black voting bloc. Normally, white 
candidates hesitated to solicit black support in fear of losing white voters. However, the 
Crusade’s 14,000 voters could potentially swing the election in any candidate’s favor. All 
but one candidate responded to the questionnaire by supporting open communication 
between the burgeoning black electorate and its councilmanic candidates. Biracial 
partnership over city affairs was to be “fairly and intelligently” split between the black 
                                                          
12 Richmond News Leader, May 13, 1960; Richmond Times Dispatch, April 27, 1964; Richmond African 
American, June 11, 1960; and John V. Moeser and Rutledge B. Dennis, The Politics of Annexation: 
Oligarchic Power in a Southern City (Boston: Schenkman Publishing Co., 1982), 17. The city council 
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community and the white city council, said one candidate. This open line of communication 
illuminated how the twilight of Jim Crow caused a shift in urban affairs. Black 
Richmonders removed whites from the center of local politics. Although it was not an even 
playing field, blacks had more electoral influence than ever before.13 
The Crusade’s 14,000 black voters impacted the outcome of the election. On June 
14, 1960, Crusade voters helped elect seven candidates to the city council. With only 27, 
853 Richmond voters, blacks comprised 50.2% of the overall electorate. This allowed black 
voters, for the first time since 1948, to make a significant impact in at-large urban elections. 
Black voter turnout was at an all-time high, as it coincided with a 20% Southern urban 
black voter increase since 1950. Black voter increase was more visible because more than 
90,000 white citizens had fled to surrounding suburban counties between 1950 and 1960. 
From this moment on, white Richmonders would not have a monopoly on who ran city 
government. Again, Civil Rights Richmond did not begin with Brown in 1954, but it began 
in 1960 when blacks broke the white monopoly over city council elections.14  
Crusade leaders were well aware of the social implications resulting from the recent 
election. Crusade president George A. Pannell mentioned, in an open letter, that electoral 
politics made black voters a “potent force” in Richmond’s post-Jim Crow landscape. 
Increased black voter presence was not “a step in the direction of harmony,” as Pannell 
                                                          
13 Richmond Times Dispatch, April 27, 1964; Donna Cooper Hamilton and Charles Hamilton, The Duel 
Agenda: Race and Social Welfare Policies of Civil Rights Organizations (Columbia University Press), 1997; 
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22 
 
 
 
suggested. Rather, it was a step towards remaking urban politics fit within the middle-class 
led black community paradigm. The Crusade furthered its Civil Rights platform by 
mentioning that blacks of both professional and working classes were not “divided in our 
aims for first-class citizenship.” Both groups sought social equality through electoral 
politics however, it was the goal of professionals like Pannell to ensure working-class 
blacks were content with middle-class leadership. In closing, Pannell issued a warning to 
future white candidates. “The colored voters of today will not be long fooled by anyone” 
into thinking that dividing black leadership best serves the entire race. This open letter was 
a clear message to white Richmonders that the black electoral influence was united along 
racial lines and would not be divided by class differences.15  
Black Richmonders used their strong 1960 performance to establish a controversial 
1962 electoral platform. The Crusade registered 11,000 more black voters than in the 1960 
election. To gain the Crusade’s endorsement, candidates had to support the removal of the 
city’s Pupil Assignment Plan, a school attendance ordinance, a wage increase for municipal 
workers to $1.15 per hour, and a proposal for ward-style voting. All of these issues were 
Civil Rights measures designed to destabilize Jim Crow. School attendance ordinances and 
removal of Harry Byrd’s Pupil Assignment Plan targeted the city’s refusal to racially 
desegregate public schools. Support for ward-style voting increased black voting strength, 
given that blacks had the most populated ward districts throughout the city. The municipal 
workers salary increase placed more purchasing power in the hands of black city workers 
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and the black community. This platform, which benefitted working and middle-class 
blacks, resulted from the newfound political agency the 1960 election provided them.16 
The Crusade platform exposed Richmond’s racial rigidity. The city was for all 
intents and purposes racially segregated in 1962. Whites and blacks lived in separate 
neighborhoods, shopped at separate malls, and worked in separate venues. Segregation was 
not as much forced as it was accepted. Despite the black voter increase, whites still held a 
56% majority. It was not until 1964 that Richmond got its second post-Reconstruction 
black councilman. Richmond’s white majority was, like most white Virginians, largely 
conservative and wanted nothing to do with liberal or black leadership. Any white 
candidate who openly supported the Crusade platform risked losing a council seat. Since 
the Crusade had to allocate its votes to white candidates, as historians John V. Moeser and 
Rutledge M. Dennis suggested, white politicians secretly negotiated with Crusade leaders 
for black votes. Crusade support came in the form of an endorsement and news articles 
about the white candidate being a friend to the black community. Since many white 
candidates engaged in this activity, they would often accuse “the other of making secret 
deals with Negro political leaders” to secure the dwindling white voter base in the 
upcoming election.17 
                                                          
16 Richmond News Leader, May 24, 1962.” Removing Pupil Placement and implementing mandatory school 
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The Fair Employment Practices Ordinance, passed just weeks before the election, 
provides a possible example of secret Crusade deals with white candidates. The Crusade’s 
platform included a measure that not only increased municipal workers salaries, but 
removed racial discrimination from salaried city employment. According to historian and 
attorney Dwight Carter Holton, grandson of eventual Virginia Governor Linwood Holton, 
seventy-five percent of black municipal workers were non-salaried and had less job 
security than their white counterparts. This ordinance was passed during the election season 
and at the height of speculation about secret deals between incumbent councilmen like 
Robert C. Throckmorton, Eleanor P. Sheppard, and Crusade leaders. Although no foul play 
was ever proven, Throckmorton, Sheppard, and three other councilmen gained Crusade 
support immediately following the passage of the ordinance in May of 1962.18   
The outcome of the 1962 election confirmed what the 1960 election suggested. 
Seven of nine Crusade supported candidates won council seats. Despite five of the seven 
Crusade sponsored candidates being endorsed by the wealthy white voter organization, 
Richmond Civic Association (RCA), two councilmen were solely endorsed by the Crusade, 
while only one councilman was elected with a lone RCA endorsement. The one RCA 
endorsed councilman, future mayor Phil Bagley, finished fifth, receiving only 9,772 votes. 
Whereas, the two Crusade sponsored candidates finished first and eighth, one receiving 
9,200 votes and the other receiving 11,348 votes. Even with a radical platform and 
endorsing two losing black candidates against a white majority, the Crusade repeated its 
results from the 1960 election. These results read not of plateauing, but of growth between 
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the two elections. In 1960, the Crusade had no organized platform and competed with two 
white voter organizations. In 1962, the Crusade had a solidified platform and rivaled a 
unified white voter organization. As the Crusade increased its difficulty, the results 
remained the same. This clearly illustrates that the further Richmond moved into the Civil 
Rights Era, the more influence its blacks exerted in city council elections.19  
White voter organizations solidified themselves against the Crusade in the 1964 
election. The RCA, along with other white voter organizations, formed Richmond Forward 
which comprised of old money conservatives like James Wheat, as well as new money 
liberals like Henry Miller. Their agenda was to secure and further Richmond’s white 
business interest during the Civil Rights Era and white economic flight. Richmond 
Forward’s candidates supported urban redevelopment and annexation, both of which 
extended Jim Crow Era politics by disenfranchising black electoral, economic, and 
residential potential. Richmond Forward garnered a reputation for “political manipulation” 
because its candidates were all Crusade rivals who set aside their differences for what 
appeared to be a continuation of white councilmanic control. They are a bunch of “string 
pullers who think Richmond begins and ends at Sixth and Broad,” exclaimed Phil Bagley 
in a Times-Dispatch interview. This coalition stopped at nothing to ensure that Richmond’s 
councilmanic control did not slip into Crusade hands in 1964 and future elections.20  
The Crusade faced problems of its own in this election. One of the problems came 
in the form of a white liberal named Howard Carwile. The son of a wealthy Charlotte 
County tobacco farmer, Carwile, was a lifelong liberal politician who championed “poor 
                                                          
19 Richmond Afro American, June 16, 1962; and “Councilmanic Election Results” June 12, 1962. The 
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20 Richmond Times Dispatch, April 7, 1964.  
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white people and the poor negro people, the small white businessman and the small negro 
businessman [to] abandon their prejudice, work together and vote together” in urban 
politics. Despite his popularity with working-class blacks, Carwile lost every state and 
local election he competed in for the last eighteen years. His recent councilmanic failures, 
according to him, came largely from the absence of the “heavy colored vote” controlled by 
the Crusade. Black Richmonders rarely broke rank in urban elections during the 1960s, 
even for Carwile who helped save the historically black Fulton and Idlewood 
neighborhoods from redevelopment.21  
Carwile’s open criticism of the Crusade exposed the class-centered flaws in black 
electoral leadership. Carwile criticized the Crusade’s tendency to “consistently endorse 
those candidates who apparently are sure winners.” More specifically, Carwile targeted the 
Crusade’s support for B.A. Cephas (a black conservative) and Phil Bagley (a white 
conservative), both of whom were highly favored to win council seats. The nominations of 
Bagley and “Mr. Cephas indicates conclusively a working alliance between the aristocracy 
of far West End and Negro intelligencia around [Virginia] Union University.” Carwile’s 
criticism suggested that black professionals worked alongside elite whites to control the 
councilmanic outcome. This is why a man like Carwile, who fancied himself a champion 
of racial equality and political pragmatism, could lose black support to “a rabid 
segregationist” and supporter of gentrification, whom the Crusade did not endorse just two 
years prior. Despite his open criticism, Carwile lost again as an independent candidate in 
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1964. However, garnering twenty-six percent of the urban vote as an independent forced 
the Crusade to endorse Carwile in 1966.22 
As blacks gained a foothold in electoral politics, they became less solidified than 
in previous elections. The 1960 and 1962 racial solidarity was in danger by 1964, due to 
working-class blacks wanting their own political leadership. Only three black candidates 
ran in 1964, but two, Ronald Charity and Neverett Eggleston Jr., were endorsed by the 
working-class organization The Voter’s Voice. Other dissenting black voter organizations 
included the West End Council of Leagues, Leagues of the 19th and 24th precincts, and the 
West End Improvement League. Reasons varied for the rise of multiple black voter 
organizations. Some blacks believed Howard Carwile and were convinced the Crusade was 
“working hand-in-glove with the R[ichmond] F[orward].” Working-class blacks suspected 
that Crusade leadership developed more than just “a corresponding relationship with white 
elites.” Rather, black elites exchanged political favors that benefited only the black middle-
class. The Crusade rarely endorsed black candidates, but the most notable one, B.A. 
Cephas, served on the pro-redevelopment City Housing Committee following the 1962 
election. That was the same election that featured public speculation about white 
councilmen disbursing municipal appointments to Crusade professionals for electoral 
support. Coincidentally, Richmond Forward supported Cephas’ 1964 campaign. 
Nevertheless, black electoral growth allowed urban blacks to be less electorally united than 
in years past.23  
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The Crusade reminded black Richmonders that electoral camaraderie, not internal 
division, fully utilized the black vote. The Crusade pled with black Richmonders to “keep 
our vote solid” because “this is the only way we can have political influence.” Crusade 
leaders used terms like “we” and “our” to place race above the seemingly obvious class 
differences between themselves and its working-class voting bloc. To the Jim Crow Era 
Crusade leadership, a diversified black vote ensured political suicide. Political survival 
came through unitary support for black leaders, who were coincidentally middle-class 
Crusade professionals. Crusade leaders wanted to maintain their monopoly on Civil Rights 
Era electoral change. Racial “solidarity is more important than one election or any 
candidate.” With a solid black vote “we can always vote out a bad candidate, but we cannot 
do this if we don’t keep our solidarity.”24 
Black electoral influence reached historic heights in the 1964 election. The 
Crusade’s appeal paid off as eight of its nine candidates won council seats. This was the 
most candidates that blacks helped elect into office in city history. One of the eight was 
affluent black real estate broker B.A. Cephas Jr., making him the second post-
Reconstruction black councilman elected since Oliver Hill in 1948. With Richmond 
Forward and the Crusade combining to elect seven of the nine councilmen, the local media 
recognized that “better to do white business community centered in the West End and the 
Negro Leadership ”controlled the electoral “balance of power.” In just four years, black 
Richmonders had a considerable share of electoral influence. This was during the era of 
poll taxes and literacy tests, which significantly hindered black voting potential. As 
America received a shift in codified racial norms with the 1964 Civil Rights Act, Richmond 
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experienced a clear transition in the racial makeup of its urban elections councilmanic 
leadership.25   
Special circumstances dictated the terms of the 1966 election. For the first time in 
city history, Richmond’s population was forty-eight percent black, an increase from forty-
six percent in 1964. Black voter registration increased by sixty-five percent from 1964, 
making the grand total of 29,970. Increased black voter registration came from the Voting 
Rights Act (VRA) being signed into law on August 6, 1965. The VRA prohibited state and 
local mandated tactics, such as literacy tests, from registering black voters in local, 
regional, and national elections. As black voter registration increased, white registration 
increased also, but their increase was only 13% going from 52,172 to 58,827. This was 
Richmond’s first election in which the black voting numbers closely resembled their actual 
growing population. The numerical increase, and the passage of the VRA, forced the 
Crusade to change the way it handled the black vote going forward, in that it took on more 
of a working-class black image. 26 
Both the Crusade and Richmond Forward chose black candidates who could secure 
the expanded working-class black vote. According to historian James Oliver Perry, 
previous electoral success, increased black population, and the VRA, caused trouble for 
middle-class run black voter organizations. Before the VRA, the Crusade was the sole 
avenue for many working-class blacks to enter electoral politics. By 1966, the VRA 
allowed blacks to enter electoral politics on their own terms. With the removal of racial 
                                                          
25 Richmond Afro American, June 13, 1964; Richmond News Leader, June 5, 1964; and Richmond News 
Leader, June 12, 1964.  
26 The Advocate 1 (July 1973) 1; Harper v. Virginia State Board of Electors, 383 U.S. (1966); City of 
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discrimination from voting, which black professionals used to consolidate political power, 
the Crusade nominated black candidates, hoping that white liberals and black faces would 
keep the expanded working-class black vote. The Crusade supported NAACP lawyer 
Henry Marsh III, black realtor B.A. Cephas, Howard Carwile, and affluent black 
businessman, Winfred Mundle. Similarly, Richmond Forward endorsed B.A. Cephas and 
Winfred Mundle, both of whom supported annexation and urban redevelopment. 
Nominating black candidates, in the face of a near 50% black population and electorate, 
meant securing the important working-class black vote for both sides.27 
The Crusade’s selection process caused internal rift within its leadership. In June 
of 1965, George Pannell resigned as Crusade president. Although white and black media 
outlets reported the event with no significant details, Howard Carwile saw it differently. 
Pannell’s resignation, according to the Crusade, exposed inherent racial and political flaws 
within the Crusade’s nomination process. It was rumored that Pannell did not support 
William Thornton’s nomination of Cephas and Mundle because they did not fit the 
“Crusade agenda” against annexation and urban redevelopment. The resignation only 
confirmed that the Crusade was a “color-based organization” that used race to consolidate 
electoral power from blacks whom racism actually affected. This resignation led some, 
mainly critics like Carwile, to speculate that the Crusade was nominating black candidates 
to maintain control over the open voter registration process created by the VRA.28 
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Richmond Forward aggressively campaigned to the expanded black voter base and 
used the Richmond Times-Dispatch to portray the Crusade as race hustlers using working-
class black votes to further their political careers. On June 9, 1966, the Times-Dispatch 
produced the editorial “A Message to the Negro Voters of Richmond.” The Times-Dispatch 
praised the “public-spirited, responsible leadership of Richmond Forward” candidates 
against the “private-regarding, autocratically controlled Crusade for Voters.” The editorial 
implied that black electoral power unjustly belonged to the Crusade. Black leadership 
wants “[you] not to use your own intelligence in deciding how to vote…not to give any 
thought to the subject. Simply vote as they tell you to.” As an alternative to racially 
autocratic voting, Richmond Forward was “publically identified… [and] work for the best 
interest of the community… people who give time…people who provide significant 
support for the Urban League and other community agencies…they are the people to whom 
leaders in your community turn when they want assistance in raising funds for 
predominantly negro institutions of higher learning.”29 
The Crusade went on the offensive to secure working-class black votes from 
conservative white politicians. The Crusade responded to Richmond Forward and the 
Times-Dispatch with an open letter titled “Who are the Richmond Newspapers?” “They 
are the champions of segregation,” said the Crusade. “They cried No, No, Never to the U.S. 
Supreme Court Decision of 1954. They banned a Pogo Comic strip that ridiculed 
segregation…[they] have repeatedly attacked every organization that has fought for and 
gained Negro rights…They attacked the NAACP; They attacked Martin Luther 
King…now they are attacking the Richmond Crusade for Voters… Long before any other 
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group cared, the Crusade fought alone for Negro political rights in Richmond.” Since the 
media and white politicians saw the potential of working-class black votes by 1966, the 
Crusade adamantly reminded the 48% minority that whites wanted not to serve the black 
constituency, but use them “because you have gained a measure of political power” from 
past elections and the VRA.30 
The Crusade survived the impact of the VRA and George Pannell’s resignation. On 
June 14, 1966, the Crusade helped elect five councilmen to office. Although three fewer 
Crusade candidates won in 1966 than in 1964, this election featured a post-Reconstruction 
high three black councilmen. The Crusade achieved a new level of independence, in that 
the election proved the Crusade could get unpopular candidates elected. This was applied 
to no other than Henry Marsh III and Howard Carwile. Marsh III headed local school 
desegregation cases and was a thorn in the side of many white conservatives. Carwile, 
while finishing last amongst his colleagues, made very few friends in opposing urban 
redevelopment. The VRA altered Richmond’s electoral landscape by removing Jim Crow 
Era politicians, like the Crusade, from gatekeeping black votes. The election results clearly 
shows how the landscape change forced the Crusade to expand its measures of maintaining 
the working-class vote by nominating black and white liberals.31 
White Richmonders understood the implications of the black electoral evolution in 
just seven years. The Norfolk Virginia-Pilot article predicted that “June 1968 deadline 
is…the point, according to computations by experts on population shifts, when Richmond 
comes face to face with the possibility that Negroes could take over control of the City 
Council.” White fears were amplified with the possibility of a black city council in 
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Richmond. This white fear stemmed from population growth, the VRA, and voter steering 
from the black professional class. Although electoral gains were important, by no means 
did it alone cause Richmond’s racial transition. School desegregation and the annexation 
crisis combined with electoral changes to racially transition the city from its 70% pre-1960 
white population to its 50/50 racial split by December of 1966.32  
School Desegregation 
The black middle-class used school desegregation, similar to electoral politics, as a 
tool to capture urban power from white elites in the midst of nationwide Civil Rights 
changes. On May 17, 1954, the U.S. Supreme Court gave black politicians the political 
currency to remake public education with the Brown decision. This judicial mandate 
attacked racially segregated public education, a white supremacist and oligarchical 
foundation of power. Segregated education allowed whites to disenfranchise blacks 
through limited access to social mobility. Segregated and inferior education ensured that 
color and condition remained fixed. Poverty, economically, socially, and legally, remained 
black. Like most southern cities, Richmond City Public Schools remained segregated after 
Brown. Through various court battles between 1960 and 1966, black professionals thrusted 
the city into the Civil Rights Era by constantly redefining how the school board complied 
with Brown. Equal access to public schools removed black education from the periphery 
and placed it at the core of political and social life. This reinvention of how black education 
operated, like electoral politics, pushed Richmond into the national Civil Rights movement, 
and more specifically, into racial transition.33  
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Richmond’s educational segregation reflected a deeper legacy of physical 
separation, or as historian Christopher Silver suggest, a “Separate City.” Blacks and whites 
lived separate lives in the same city. There were few places that blacks and whites had 
intimate interaction. Public schools reinforced societal segegration. According to Silver, 
state and local white elites used Jim Crow laws to ensure both whites and blacks to live 
separated by racialized class-defined spaces. On a national level, Federal Housing 
Authority lending practices, urban redevelopment, white flight, and redlining, strengthened 
racial segregation by placing it within the economy through real estate practices. Public 
schools did not develop into racially segregated entities, they were created as racialy 
segregated institutions, used to indoctrinate young whites and blacks that racial separation 
was not only normal, but an essential facet of life. Although many places began 
destabilizing segregationist school systems in the late 1950s, it was not until 1960 that 
Richmonders broke their societal legacy of limited black-white adolescent interaction.34 
The desegregation snowball began in 1958, with middle-class blacks challenging 
the limits of Massive Resistance. Local blacks began Richmond’s educational reform 
through the Warden v. Richmond School Board case in 1958. The suit was filed by the 
parents of Lorna R. Warden. The Pupil Placement Board, a Massive Resistance agency put 
into place by Senator Harry Byrd to ensure that Virginia schools remained segregated, 
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rejected six black children from admission into an all-white neighborhood school. 
Realizing that every white child in their neighborhood was assigned to the all-white school, 
Warden’s attorneys sued the city for violating Brown. This suit, like others that followed, 
was a part of a larger movement to remove racial disenfranchisement from public 
education. The plaintiffs asked the court to include all black Richmond children in the 
lawsuit, given that they fell victim to the Pupil Placement Board’s purposeful design to 
illegally maintain racial segregation. In an effort of temporary appeasement, in 1961, the 
Virginia Supreme Court and the Placement Board allowed Lorna Renee Warden to attend 
the all-white neighborhood school; however, the other five plaintiffs, as well as black 
Richmond students en masse were not admitted into any white public school. Nevertheless, 
local middle-class black pressure forced Richmond’s public school officials to do what 
Brown itself could not: integrate.35 
Immediately after the Warden case hit the docket in 1960, Richmond’s white power 
structure attempted to control the imminent desegregation process. If handled incorrectly, 
school desegregation could place political power in the hands of local black professionals, 
who were eager to garner political power in the middle of the Civil Rights Era power 
vacuum. Many urban whites, like Attorney General J. Lindsay, lamented that “integration 
of the races in the school system will set education back” because “[Richmond] will close 
schools rather than permit them to be operated with Negro and white pupils in the same 
classroom.” Although some felt that Richmond’s racial divide was so deep that school 
closures would replace segregated schools, state and local legislators knew better. The fact 
that Richmond was the financial and cultural center of Virginia made its public school 
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system vital to the regional and national image of the state. Despite Charlottesville, 
Norfolk, Warren County, and Prince Edward County schools closing, for Richmond, 
closure was not an option. 36  
After cleaning house, white officials tokenly desegregated public schools, to keep 
their control over urban affairs. On February 24, 1960, Richmond Pupil Placement Board’s 
Andrew A. Fairley, Beverly H. Randolph Jr., and Hugh V. White issued their letters of 
resignation. All three agreed that the threat of federal closure would legislators to integrate 
Richmond Public Schools, something their collective conscience did not permit them to 
do. One of the three men issued his disappointment with city officials not “fight[ing] with 
every legal and honorable means of mixing the races in the public schools.” The newly 
appointed Pupil Placement Board members, University of Virginia Professor Earnest J. 
Oglesby, State Department Coordinator Alfred L. Wingo, and Department of Education 
Assistant Supervisor of Rehabilitation Edward T. Justis, met on August 15, 1960, to begin 
Richmond’s in-house desegregation. This effort resulted in only two black children being 
placed into white schools. However, on September 6, 1960, Richmond’s public schools 
were officially integrated. Richmond’s token integration coincided with a statewide effort 
to place enough black students into white schools to prevent any major NAACP lawsuit 
forcing federal judges to desegregate public schools. By September of 1960, there were 
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over 200,000 black students throughout the state and less than 170 of them were enrolled 
in traditional white schools.37  
Professional blacks pushed harder for desegregation by testing the limits of token 
integration. In 1961, Wallace Reid Calloway, son of prominent black physician and local 
Civil Rights advocates William C. and Alice Calloway, was denied placement into a white 
neighborhood school (Chandler Middle School). The Calloways lived in one of 
Richmond’s few interracial neighborhoods, in which  black and white children were placed 
in racially identifiable schools. The Calloways challenge the Placement Board’s placement, 
forcing the board to review its initial placement. The Calloway controversy, like the 
Warden case, was strategic because the Calloways understood Richmond’s school 
desegregation was a part of an elaborate token regime. In fact, Calloways later argued, in 
court, that the Placement Board allegedly reached its unofficial black quota for the city’s 
white public schools, thus their son was denied. Although the local NAACP threatened to 
file a class action lawsuit against the city, Richmond’s Pupil Placement Board reaffirmed 
the original decision. The board had a legal leg to stand on because a black school was 
geographically closer (only by twelve feet) to the Calloways’ home.38      
Despite the unfavorable ruling, the Calloway case brought unwanted attention to 
the Richmond’s Pupil Placement Board practices. The Calloway controversy allowed Civil 
Rights attorneys and local NAACP members Henry Marsh III and Oliver Hill to expose 
the Placement Board’s usage of racial criteria in public school placements, as well as the 
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lengths white city officials went to maintain racial segregation. Despite the Calloway loss, 
the public attention it drew, according to school desegregation historian Robert Pratt, 
allowed the local NAACP to openly “demand speedier compliance with Brown.” The 
demand was followed by the placement of thirty-seven black students into white schools 
in the 1961-1962 school year. The Pupil Placement Board’s segregationist placements 
caused the Crusade for Voters to run their 1962 campaign on the abolishment of the 
Placement Board and a mandatory school attendance ordinance, forcing white children in 
black dominated areas to attend similar schools. Not receiving any reprisal from city 
councilmen about placement practices, NAACP member Minerva Bradley, her attorneys 
Samuel Tucker and Henry Marsh III, and ten other black parents filed the Bradley v. 
Richmond School Board lawsuit. This suit, like the Warden case, was a part of a concerted 
effort to completely desegregate city schools and use Civil Rights legislation to remove 
educational disenfranchisement from Richmond’s public schools. 39  
Bradley attorneys furthered Warden’s cause by turning school desegregation into 
political power for the black middle class. “Virginia has the largest and most effective 
token integration plan in the county,” however Virginian blacks were not satisfied “with 
even the best tokenism,” said Roy Wilkins at the NAACP’s Virginia Convention. Wilkins 
foreshadowed his NAACP colleagues attempt to use Brown for political influence through 
education reform. While asking the court to “[require] the defendants to transfer the pupils 
from Negro public schools to white public schools,” attorneys Henry Marsh III and Samuel 
Tucker requested the city “be enjoined from operating racially segregated schools and be 
required to submit to the District Court a plan of desegregation.” To better their chances 
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for a dismissal, the Pupil Placement Board assigned “90 additional Negro pupils” to white 
schools the following school year. The increase of black placements to white schools, in 
the midst of Bradley, illuminated how middle-class blacks used Brown to renegotiate urban 
power. Just as white elites controlled Richmond through segregating public schools, black 
professionals used desegregation to relinquish power from white elites. Segregated 
schooling was built on white leaders not sharing power with black leadership; therefore the 
black elites ensured that desegregated schooling came with white elites negotiating power 
with them in a way that Jim Crow prevented, through integration.40  
Bradley put Richmond public schools in a state of disarray. On March 10, 1963, 
the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals ruled in favor of the Bradley plaintiffs, finding 
Richmond City Public Schools in violation of Brown for maintaining racially segregated 
schools. The sociopolitical implications were astounding. The court ruled that Richmond 
had to work with the Bradley attorneys to construct “adequate” desegregation plans. This 
was the first time the federal government required white city officials to share power with 
black leaders. This, also, marked the first time blacks inspired actual white concern over 
how Richmond’s public education should racially function. If public schools were to 
continue their existence, it would be at the discretion of federal compliance to white and 
black leaders negotiating the racial makeup of public schools.41  
The Bradley ruling illuminated how white supremacy forged the connection 
between school segregation and city politics. “Had we attempted to integrate the schools 
in the early years,” said School Board President and eventual Supreme Court Justice Lewis 
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F. Powell Jr., it “would have resulted in closing the schools.” Many knew that the city 
council “provided funds to operate the public schools,” however, many councilmen were 
“stridently opposed to any integration,” personally and professionally. Court ordered 
biracial cooperation seemed impossible because “both Richmond newspapers opposed 
integration, as did Virginia governors, and the majority of the Virginia Assembly.” The 
original Pupil Placement Board members who resigned on June 1, 1960 were not outliers 
in their personal and professional opposition to integrated schools. Rather, they were a part 
of generational obstruction to any level of educational equality between blacks and 
whites.42  
Biracial cooperation pushed Richmond’s school desegregation crisis away from 
tokenism and towards its second stage: Freedom of Choice. On March 19, 1963, the 
Richmond School Board formulated, the city council agreed, and the court approved the 
Freedom of Choice Plan. Freedom of Choice allowed families of both races to choose their 
children’s schools system. However, the Placement Board approved or denied the request 
based on factors such as “adequate” transportation, competency compared to his or her 
peers, and overall fit. Federal Judge John Butzner, NAACP lawyers Henry Marsh III and 
Samuel Tucker, Superintendent Henry I. Willet, and School Board Vice-Chairman Frank 
S. Calkins felt considerably “happy” with the Freedom of Choice Plan. Although Marsh 
and Tucker had reservations about Pupil Placement remaining the gatekeepers of 
integration, the biracial coalition made history by slowly removing Jim Crow from 
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Richmond public schools. Marsh later challenged Freedom of Choice in the Supreme Court 
he discovered that the color-blind driving factor of personal choice perpetuated racial 
segregation in public schools.43 
Freedom of Choice’s inability to desegregate schools forced federal authorities to 
investigate Richmond’s public school system. In 1964, the U.S. Department of Health, 
Education, and Welfare (HEW) placed Richmond Public School System under 
investigation. HEW’s investigation began after Henry Marsh’s request to remove the Pupil 
Placement Board from Richmond Public Schools was denied. Richmond bureacrats were 
not alone in opposing school desegregation, as school systems across Virginia refused to 
adhere to Brown. The General Assembly’s most effective measure was releasing state 
funds to school systems refusing to integrate, while cutting off state funds to any integrated 
school system. The Civil Rights Act of 1964 gave HEW authority to remove federal funds 
from any school system found in violation of Brown, regardless of state and local law. 
Therefore, the U.S. Commissioner of Education Dr. Woodrow Wilkerson charged 
Virginia’s State Board of Education Deputy Superintendent Harry R. Elmore with ensuring 
Virginia’s public school systems adhered to both Brown and the Civil Rights Act. Any 
school system refusing to comply with Elmore’s regional meetings and interracial 
consolidation plans were barred from receiving federal funds and would be sued by the 
Justice Department in federal court.44 
With federal attention on Virginia’s public schools, black professionals used Brown 
to test the limits of their political power. “Federal control was very evident” as on January 
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22, 1965, U.S. Commissioner of Education Dr. Woodrow Wilkerson assured 
Superintendent Willet, School Board President Powell and Mayor Phil Bagley that federal 
funds would be removed if they did not create a desegregation plan that conformed to Title 
VI of the Civil Rights Act. This threat came on the heels of Henry Marsh III’s and Samuel 
Tucker’s victory in the U.S. Supreme Court. Marsh and Tucker won an appeal overruling 
Judge Butzner’s Freedom of Choice Plan for Richmond. Freedom of Choice was used in 
many desegregating southern school districts; however, Richmond’s Freedom of Choice 
plan maintained de facto segregation. Not one white child attended a black school, and few 
black children attended white schools. “You could feel a political change,” as black 
professionals, for the second time, used Civil Rights law to gain more authority in the 
outlook of public education.45 
By 1966, professional black political gains in education inspired negative racial 
tension. During the 1965-66 academic school year, Richmond’s white population fell three 
percent from the previous year, putting it at about fifty percent. As the white population 
dwindled, the white student population followed. Richmond hosted a 64% black student 
majority, with whites being at a staggering 36% and declining. While many white families 
fled to suburban public and private schools, urban race relations worsened. In Richmond, 
both blacks and whites used Freedom of Choice to stay in segregated schools. White 
families refused to send their children to schools that were “identifiably black in any way,” 
according to Pratt. Black families were haunted with stories about persecution by white 
students “when there was no teacher supervision.” This behavior only reassured black 
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families not to send their children “where they were not welcomed.” Using Freedom of 
Choice to attend white schools had economic implications on the black household. “Blacks 
were threatened and were actually fired for expressing their support for desegregation.” 
“Rather courageous” were the blacks who sent their children to white schools, a risk many 
refused to take. These challenges rendered Richmond’s Freedom of Choice useless in 
achieving integration. However, Richmond continued this program until it was federally 
removed in 1968.46 
Between 1960 and 1966, Civil Rights Era Richmond was bolstered by school 
desegregation. Alone, electoral politics did not shift municipal power to the black elite. 
Education reform, through the removal of racial segregation and the political uncertainty 
that followed, forced white politicians to negotiate political power with the black 
professional class. The shift of overt segregation into more covert means retaining Jim 
Crow, via tokenism and Freedom of Choice, and black electoral gains caused white city 
council members to reach across the aisle to suburban leadership for help maintaining a 
white majority in the heart of the former Confederacy. Racial solidarity had its class-
centered limits. For whites, racial limits were tested when class interests collided over the 
economic and racial importance of Richmond during the Civil Rights Era.  
Annexation Crisis 
For white leadership, electoral politics and school desegregation demolished their 
Jim Crow-style power structure over Richmond. The shifting electoral demographic and 
school desegregation greased the wheels of Richmond’s racial transition from a majority 
white to majority black city. “Whites wanted to maintain control of the city of Richmond,” 
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amidst Civil Rights Era changes. “So how do you do it, that was the question” white city 
and state officials were obsessed with according to historian John V. Moeser. The answer 
was annexation. However, as suburban leaders gained political power through industrial 
and white middle-class migration, they became enemies to urban white officials. 
Suburbanites saw the fall of Jim Crow as the means to segregate themselves from Civil 
Rights changes in Richmond. Between 1960 and 1966, suburban whites gained and used 
their political identity to prevent their affluent white neighbors from annexing their 
Chesterfield and Henrico County suburbs. As city officials endlessly searched for 
solutions, they were repeatedly blocked by the middle-class whites, ultimately forcing the 
General Assembly to intervene as the city went from 70% to 50% white between 1950 and 
1966.47   
Before annexation, Richmond’s white politicians wished to offset white flight by 
maintaining Richmond’s white majority through a simple merger. The Richmond City 
Council’s six member Richmond-Henrico Consolidation Committee proposed a merger 
that would consolidate Henrico County with Richmond City. The merger would make over 
105,000 middle-class white suburbanites Richmond residents by January 1, 1962. The 
consolidated city would have five boroughs, four in the old Henrico borders and one in 
“the old city.” Although white city officials were willing to share territory with suburban 
leaders, they were not so willing to share political power. The merger would include eleven 
councilmen with four coming from Richmond, one from the four boroughs in Henrico, and 
three being elected at-large from the consolidated city. Richmond outnumbered Henrico 
by over 100,000 people and by more than 22,000 white voters. Therefore, the three at-large 
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council seats would undoubtedly have been inhabited by Richmond politicians, giving the 
city a regular seven-to-four councilmanic advantage over their suburban neighbors.48  
The reasons for the merger were, as Moeser and Silver alluded too, racially coded. 
White flight and its economic implications led to the 1961 city council proposing the 
Henrico merger. The 1960 election, which mobilized 14,000 black voters, and the Warren 
case, forcing school officials to desegregate public schools, signaled the beginning of the 
end of what many saw coming up to ten years prior. Richmond was getting blacker. The 
breakdown of segregation between the forty-two percent black population and over sixty 
percent black public school population sent white residents to surrounding suburban 
counties. Although recuperating the lost tax base financially incentivized the merger, what 
that tax base socially represented remained racially coded. “Race remained at the heart of 
the controversy over the merger,” said Silver. The civility from which white Richmonders 
spoke about white flight illuminated racial fears about the former capital of the 
Confederacy hosting a black majority. Metropolitan residents understood “the city tax base 
is automatically lowered when the black population increases.” However, the reasons 
behind this well-known fact remained undiscussed publicly. Metropolitan whites “feared 
being in the minority” because blacks reminded them of the inequality Jim Crow produced 
and the economic and social privilege white Richmonders enjoyed at the expense of black 
residents.49  
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Henrico suburbanites made it clear that they would not voluntarily cede their land 
and white citizenry to the council. Henrico residents voted against the merger on December 
12, 1961, with a sixty-five percent majority. Voters in one Henrico District (Tuckahoe) 
supported the merger. Despite Henrico’s Board of Supervisors president S.A. Burnette 
noting that the county was “wide open so far as any cooperation in support of the 
metropolitan area is concerned,” it was clear that Henrico residents were unwilling to help 
the city council keep Richmond majority white. Richmond City Manager Horace H. 
Edwards felt suburbanites voted “with their hearts instead of their heads.” Their hearts were 
consumed with the racially identifiable class-centered suburban lifestyle. Yet, their heads 
represented the “one mind” or prejudice they shared with urban whites about “a black 
takeover of Richmond.” Desperation forced city officials to become politically aggressive; 
therefore, on December 26, 1961, the council announced its intentions to file an annexation 
ordinance with the Commonwealth of Virginia against Henrico and Chesterfield 
Counties.50 
The city council began its hostile takeover of the suburban white majority in 1962. 
On January 1, the council officially filed an annexation suit against Henrico and 
Chesterfield Counties within each respective circuit courts. The council, along with City 
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Manager Edwards, requested 152 square miles and 115,000 residents from Henrico, as well 
as 51 square miles from Chesterfield, which included more than 40,000 residents. Both 
Henrico and Chesterfield populations were majority middle-class and at least 92% white. 
Annexations were powerful. They had the potential to give Virginian cities larger 
economies. However, they sparked long political battles between urban white elites and 
suburban residents over the vitality of cities in metropolitian areas. Uniquely, Virginia was 
and is the only state to have independent cities and counties. So cooperation between urban 
and suburban leaders was key to achieve any mutually beneficial end. However, Henrico 
and Chesterfield inspired Matthew Lassiter’s “Silent Majority” suburban analysis, in that 
they used their social class to create an identity that separated them from politically allying 
with elite whites on exclusively racial terms.51 
Richmond newspapers promoted the annexations as a shared interest between urban 
and suburban whites. The annexations were supposed to save, not just Richmond, but the 
entire metropolitan area from the physical and economic urban decay seen in Detroit, 
Newark, and Washington D.C. The Times-Dispatch warned county residents that 
“Richmond must either expand or decline.” Only a “political union” between urban and 
suburban whites will keep black leaders from the city council. “New opportunities for 
community progress” only came if Richmond remained majority white. Although suburban 
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residents lived outside the city, most of their daily lives were spent downtown. The media 
wished Henrico/Chesterfield leadership and residents understood that rejecting annexation 
meant rendering Richmond to a dilapidated slum. Saving Richmond was as much 
economic, as it was racial. In the eyes of the media and urban white leaders, class interest 
should not render race and its economic implications useless.52 
Media propaganda favoring annexation was as realistic as it was ideologically 
driven. The Times-Dispatch contended that both counties could not provide municipal 
services fitting a growing metropolitan area. Both counties could not provide ample 
sewage, local employment, recreational services, postal services, public libraries, 
museums, hospitals, electricity, and public schools to the spread out towns and sprawling 
subdivisions located with their borders. The Times-Dispatch insisted that if suburbanites 
reconnected with the city, public services would improve. Increased citizenry would “make 
no substantial contribution to the cost of providing the municipal services and the 
management and administrative function.” Although the Richmond media advertised how 
the metropolitan area benefited from the annexation, county leaders and suburban residents 
risked losing their political power. Independent counties were not politically tied to cities, 
thus annexation permanently removed land and tax revenue from suburbna counties, with 
little chance of future return. Therefore, suburban leadership were hesitant to negotiate 
annexations with city officials.53      
The Virginia Assembly’s legislative support ensured that Richmond’s annexation 
suits would be heard. Both Henrico and Chesterfield Boards of Supervisors filed appeals 
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for dismissal to the Virginia Supreme Court. State support for the city council ran deep, as 
the Assembly passed legislation ensuring that any anti-annexation bill passed would not 
impact the current suits with either county, regardless of the length of the outcome. “The 
General Assembly was obsessed with maintaining racial segregation. In fact, that's all they 
did” during the 1960s according to Moeser. The Assembly’s pro-annexation sentiment 
caused both appeals to be denied almost immediately. As black Richmonders gained 
political power in urban politics, keeping black leadership out of the city council became a 
state interest. Blacks gaining political control of the capital city could bring about a regime 
change to Virginia’s affluent white oligarchical power structure. Therefore, if Henrico and 
Chesterfield's leadership wished to end annexation talks, they had to defeat city leaders in 
court.54  
Despite state support, the annexation court limited Richmond’s territorial growth. 
On the eve of the 1964 councilmanic election, the city council lost its annexation battle 
against Henrico. Richmond’s land proposals were “insufficient” and did not justify the 
request for over fifty-one square miles from Henrico according to the annexation court. 
Instead, the court awarded the city seventeen square miles and 45,000 residents, of which 
99% were white. The seventeen square miles was the closest parcel of land to the city; 
however, it was undeveloped and would cost 55 million dollars to purchase and even more 
to develop for residential and commercial use. The rejection had political implications. 
According to state law, a lost annexation suit prevented Richmond from attempting to 
annex Henrico for the next five years. Adversely, accepting or deny the reward legitimized 
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the annexation court’s ruling, closing the door on any future annexation of Henrico 
County.55  
The council used the Henrico misfortune to double-down on Chesterfield. After the 
failed annexation appeal in Henrico, the Virginia Supreme Court upheld the annexation 
ruling on January 20, 1965. This forced city officials to either accept or decline the award. 
Either way, Henrico could not be annexed for five years. Although former city councilmen 
Wayland Rennie lamented that city officials made the wrong decision, the city council 
declined the award. The decline was a gamble. Thinking that a 55 million dollar bill for 
just seventeen square miles significantly hindered potential gains in the Chesterfield suit, 
the council temporarily saved the city budget to fight Chesterfield officials in court. It was 
clear that Richmond had to expand, yet the council’s refusal to take peanuts from Henrico 
signified that Chesterfield suburbanites were facing an even hungrier and more aggressive 
giant, who would not rest until its suburban neighbors cooperated.56 
Both Richmond and Chesterfield County officials understood the racial 
implications of the annexation suit. White flight, the failed 1961 merger, and the rejected 
1964 Henrico annexation left Richmond with a fifty one percent white majority by January 
1, 1965. Between February and October of 1965, Richmond lawyer Andrew J. Bent, Mayor 
Morrill M. Crowe, and City Manager Horace Edwards conducted secret meetings with 
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Chesterfield Board of Supervisors Chairman Irving G. Horner, and Chesterfield Board 
Executive Secretary Melvin W. Burnett. The topic was Richmond’s territorial expansion, 
however, the category was race. “It was common knowledge that the City of Richmond 
was going black…we realized it… They claimed they had to have people from Chesterfield 
to offset the growing black race in the city… This was the basis of their negotiations,” 
according to Burnett. Richmond officials had a different perspective on the negotiations. 
“You would have a right to say that race entered into it,” said Mayor Crowe during the 
Curtis Holt Sr. City of Richmond case six years later. However, evidence suggest race 
never entered a discussion because it was the discussion. Since both sides understood that 
“the General Assembly will not allow the Capital City to be eternally thwarted in its efforts 
to procure room to grow,” both urban and suburban leadership willingly negotiated a land 
and citizen settlement according to News-Leader reporter Charles Houston. Suburban 
leadership’s willingness to negotiate was not a willingness to settle because city officials 
had a track record of losing annexation suits.57   
City officials went 0 for 2 against its suburban neighbors. Although both sides 
understood the racial implications of not annexing, constituency interest prevented an out-
of-court settlement. Chesterfield leadership, headed by Board Supervisor Irvin Horner, 
refused to relinquish 45,000 white citizens and ¾ of Northern Chesterfield to Mayor Crowe 
and City Manager Edwards. Suburban leadership was only willing to help Richmond’s 
white elite if the suburbs were not annexed in the near future. Because city officials refused 
to relinquish future annexation rights against Chesterfield, the case went to trial. On 
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November 27, 1965, Judge William Old of Chesterfield County and Judge Vincent L. 
Sexton Jr. of Bluefield County voted to dismiss the case 2 to 1 over Judge Elliot Marshall 
of Front Royal. This time, there was no award from the court. This left Richmond at the 
mercy of the state, so Richmond officials appealed, leaving the city’s racial fate up to the 
1966 General Assembly.58 
Richmond officials’ inability to racially dilute the state capital ignited the General 
Assembly to intervene in the annexation crisis. Because, as Virginia Delegate T. Coleman 
Andrews Jr. stated, “antiquated annexation laws,” deterred “the logical expansion of 
Virginia’s cities,”  the Virginia Supreme Court dismissed the annexation case and ensured 
it was “stricken from the court docket.” Since Richmond never officially lost the 
annexation case, city officials could resume the suit the following year. Maintaining 
Richmond’s white majority was just as much a state interest, as it was an urban interest. 
Richmond’s racial transition “worried the General Assembly,” as they became as obsessed 
with annexation as Richmond’s white leadership according to author Benjamin Campbell. 
The General Assembly issued a Blue Ribbon Commission, on April 4, 1966, that provided 
Assembly members with a “feasible” plan for annexation. Although the Commission did 
not report its findings until 1967, the state made it clear that city officials’ inability to 
control Civil Rights changes threatened more than the metropolitan area. Never before had 
the former Confederate capital been unable to control the population and political growth 
of its black residents. If Civil Rights changes allowed blacks to politically control the state 
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capital, this trend could  spread to other majority black Virginian cities. White fear of racial 
uncertainty was very real and it penetrated even the highest forms of political power.59 
White fears surrounding annexation heightened after the 1966 election. Only a 
week after three black councilmen won city council seats, the six white councilmen secretly 
negotiated with Chesterfield’s Board of Supervisors over territorial expansion. If “present 
political trends continue in Richmond,” forwarned  the Norfolk-Virginia Pilot, “[black]  
voters will grow steadily stronger, and within a very few years they may be able to elect a 
majority of Richmond’s nine councilmen.” Councilman James Wheat asked Chesterfield 
Board Member Irvin Horner for “44,000 affluent white people,” to offset the city’s 50% 
black population. These fears even penetrated the protected Henrico County. “There’s no 
sense in kidding ourselves,” said one anonymous Henrico official in the Times-Dispatch 
article “Vote May Spur Merger Attempt.” Annexation talks between Chesterfield and 
Richmond officials “would indicate to anyone that it is the result of the large Negro vote.” 
Although neither side ceded to the other on their terms for annexation, it became blatantly 
obvious that Richmond’s six-year racial transition from a majority white to a racially split 
city destabilized metropolitan politics going into 1967.60 
Conclusion 
Richmond was not the same city in 1966 as it was in 1960. The city went from a 
white majority city with a segregated school system and all-white city council to a racially 
split population, integrated schools, and three black councilmen. This rapid change brought 
Richmond closer to a racial shift in the city’s power structure. The question is “what 
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inspired this drastic racial transition?” Civil Rights Era advances and the destabilization of 
Jim Crow brought about the beginning of this complicated saga. Councilmanic politics, 
school desegregation, and annexation only amplified the foreign political terrain urban 
blacks, affluent whites, and suburbanites had to navigate. Just as urban blacks used 
unfamiliar (Civil Rights legislation) tactics to alter the political landscape of a Jim Crow 
city, affluent whites reciprocated with an  annexation deal with suburban leadership. This, 
along with Henry Marsh III’s campaign against urban redevelopment and Judge Robert 
Merhige’s school consolidation, added to Richmond’s Civil Rights Era political instability. 
Furthermore, as 1967 approached, race and class differences heightened, further 
complicating Richmond’s shift from a white to a black majority city.  
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Chapter 2: 1967-1970 The Middle Years 
The years between 1960 and 1966 characterized black Civil Rights Era gains; 
however, the four years between 1967 and 1970 highlight the repeal of those gains. The 
city began 1967 with a 50/50 white-black population, however, it ended 1970 with a 58% 
white majority. The reversal in Richmond’s racial shift came from five major events: Henry 
Marsh III’s fight against urban redevelopment, the 1968 city council election, the 1969 
annexation, the 1970 city council election, and the 1970 busing scheme. These five events 
prevented the former Confederate capital and its city council from becoming majority black 
at the twilight of the Civil Rights Era. However, the annexation quick-fix set the stage for 
black and white class conflict ultimately resulting in federal involvement through two 
landmark lawsuits: Bradley v. Richmond School Board and Holt v. City of Richmond, 
Virginia. The results of these post-1970 cases completed Richmond’s power shift as the 
city received its majority black councilmanic leadership.   
Urban Redevelopment  
Previous electoral gains allowed black leadership to challenge white leaders on the 
Richmond’s most controversial issue: urban redevelopment. White city councilmen, 
headed by Phil Bagley, devised urban redevelopment strategies that replaced almost 10,000 
black residents from the city’s core with new expressways to the suburbs. Councilman 
Henry Marsh III, along with the black working-class, fought the redevelopment strategy 
throughout Marsh’s first two terms. White city leaders sequestered support from suburban 
leadership; however, suburban class interest prevented any urban-suburban white coalition 
sidestepping Marsh’s anti-redevelopment agenda. Marsh successful opposition prevented 
working-class neighborhoods from turning into mall parking lots. Without Marsh’s 
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successful opposition, the 1967 redevelopment strategy would have mirrored the I-95 
project. White leadership’s inability to redevelop Richmond not only made the 1968 
election the most important election in city history, it ensured annexation as the only 
measure to continue white leadership over a white majority Richmond.   
Between 1967 and 1970, urban white leadership attempted to physically redevelop 
Richmond for the second time. Like the I-95 project, this slum clearance plan would “take 
poor people, Negro people from their homes and property and let them vegetate for the rest 
of their lives in cinder block [public] housing,” according Councilman Howard Carwile. 
With physical decay and decreased tax revenue, the city council assigned the Richmond 
Redevelopment Housing Authority (RRHA) and the Richmond Metropolitan Authority 
(RMA) to “construct a downtown expressway linking the city’s core with mushrooming 
suburbs to the southwest.” This strategy provided Chesterfield residents with immediate 
access to the inner city, while creating physical barriers between East End housing projects 
and “middle-class white neighborhoods to the West” End. Later called “The City’s Biggest 
Disgrace” by historian Christopher Silver, this plan would have alleviated the housing 
displacement that I-95 started in 1957. Blacks would have been residentially relocated from 
the city’s core, leaving it open for white businesses and Virginia Commonwealth 
University expansion.61 
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Henry Marsh III allied with white liberal Howard Carwile to challenge urban 
redevelopment. The first RMA and RRHA plans were to demolish Idlewood and Fulton. 
Both neighborhoods had “cracked and crumbling houses,” and many within white 
leadership thought these were “the worst section[s] of the city;” making both “sites for light 
industry” and redevelopment said former Councilwoman Eleanor P. Sheppard in Times-
Dispatch interview. Fulton’s redevelopment would have displaced more than 2,400 
homeowners from “their humble hovels” and threw them into “racial ghettoes… [for] the 
remainder of their natural lives.” So Carwile mobilized Fulton residents, into the Fulton 
Improvement Association (FIA), which drew its own rehabilitation plans that “allow[ed] 
homeowners to keep their homes.” After two years of FIA and city council negotiations, 
the Fulton neighborhood was partial rehabilitated and not completely redeveloped. As for 
Marsh and Idlewood, redevelopment would have displaced over 900 black working-class 
families. Marsh wanted to “delay the execution…on the Idlewood corridor,” so he asked 
and received a stay on the project. This delay along with Carwile’s Fulton situation not 
only froze over two million dollars’ worth of federal and local funding, it created tensions 
within the city council.62  
Marsh’s opposition to urban redevelopment created a rivalry between himself and 
Councilman Phil Bagley. During council meetings about redevelopment, both Marsh and 
Bagley headed their respective constituencies. Bagley represented urban white business 
elites while Marsh represented potentially displaced blacks. Marsh went on record saying 
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that Bagley and Richmond Forward’s (RF) support of redevelopment “jeopardize[ed] 
efforts to provide more housing in the city.” There were “human problems involved in the 
displacement of persons.” To Bagley, Marsh was turning redevelopment into “political 
capital,” using it to exploit the displacement aspect of redevelopment to maintain working-
class constituency throughout the city. Black political gains allowed Marsh III to oppose 
white leadership in ways former black councilmen Oliver Hill and B.A. Cephas could not.  
His opposition to Bagley, the face of urban redevelopment, encouraged working-class 
black residents voicing their dissatisfaction with white leaders.63 
Black Richmonders resisted redevelopment plans for Jackson Ward. Marsh’s 
Idlewood opposition was defeated in the council 5-4 in late November 1966. With this slim 
victory, white councilmen proposed another expressway plan through Jackson Ward, as 
the residential rate suffered from the aftermath of I-95. Members of the City Housing 
Committee Winfred Mundle, B.A. Cephas, and James Wheat were tasked with 
consolidating displaced blacks in the city’s East End housing projects. Harold H. Bradley, 
head of Jackson Ward’s voting district, organized sixty residents in a “boycott of 
downtown merchants as a means of forcing a rerouting of the downtown corridor…the $95 
million expressway is being built for downtown [business] interest” at the expense of 
working-class black homeowners said, Bradley. Since downtown businesses benefited 
from the expressway, according to Bradley, “we are going to leave downtown Richmond 
alone for a little while…and see how they get along.” Likewise, Reverend E.E. Smith 
encouraged blacks to boycott downtown businesses and “battle Richmond Forward at the 
polls” if Jackson Ward was to be redeveloped. 64 
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Black Richmonders increased their mobilized efforts to save Jackson Ward. Black 
residents “packed the council chambers” on the warm spring night of April 25, 1967, 
hoping to convince the five pro-redevelopment council members to reconsider the urban 
renewal plans. “Do not displace our neighborhood; do not put the people out of their houses 
who have no place to go…do not displace our people,” exclaimed neighborhood 
representative Henry Clarke. Councilman Howard Carwile supported the cause by 
criticizing what he called “Jim Crow housing proposals.” After the emotional pleas 
convinced the pro-redevelopment sector of the council to reject the expressway plan, 
Carwile congratulated black residents “for initiating demonstrations against the 
expressway.” Black neighborhood activism, electoral gains, and councilmanic leadership, 
prevented white leadership from displacing black residents. Black redevelopment 
opposition forced white leaders to sequester support from suburban leadership to relocate 
blacks from the city’s core by investing “more than $1 million in South Richmond” for 
public housing.65 
White leadership ran into suburban opposition while trying to relocate blacks from 
the city’s core to South Richmond. With core redevelopment temporarily suspended, the 
city council proposed public housing construction near the Richmond-Chesterfield border. 
Support from suburban leadership would have ensured the project, given that Chesterfield 
property values were directly affected by the construction taking place on its border. 
However, suburban leader Chesterfield Board of Supervisors Member Frederick T. Grey 
opposed the construction when city councilmen approached the Board during January of 
1968. According to Grey, suburbanites only supported “luxury-type apartment buildings” 
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near their border, not low-income housing projects. Grey made it very clear that urban 
political problems should stay within city borders. Housing projects, according to Grey, 
caused a huge “disturbance of a stable community…let’s not overcrowd South Richmond, 
let us not build ourselves a ghetto;” was the sentment Grey represented in his objection.  
Grey’s objection caused the city council to veto its own proposed measure. The fear of 
black neighbors, along with Richmond’s political drama sitting on suburban borders, 
prevented suburban leadership from helping the city council with the redevelopment 
problem that Marsh, Carwile, and the working-class blacks created within the city.66 
As redevelopment woes intensified, black leadership, headed by Marsh, 
rehabilitated Richmond’s East End. The city was, by 1969, forty square miles, yet it had 
the sixth most concentrated public housing tract in America. East End was five percent of 
Richmond’s land mass and held more than fifty percent of its poverty. “When I think of 
Church Hill,” a black East End neighborhood, “I think of the people who need many more 
services from the city than they are getting,” said Marsh. As he pushed for housing codes 
that protected black neighborhoods from dilapidation and redevelopment, black 
councilmen B.A. Cephas and Vice Mayor Winfred Mundle supported Marsh’s campaign. 
“The level of frustration and hopelessness is growing rapidly in the city,” as white leaders 
opposed Marsh III in every way. To Councilman Bagley, Richmond was a “77 million 
dollar cooperation.” The only problem was that Marsh’s rehabilitation plan ensured “this 
corporation spends 77 million,” guaranteeing “it doesn’t earn it” back. Black leaders fought 
redevelopment plans until the council applied for and received a $450,000 federal housing 
grant. The grant went exclusively to “making Church Hill a model neighborhood” for 
                                                          
66 “City Council Vetoes Two Big Projects for Apartments,” Richmond News Leader January 23, 1968. 
61 
 
 
 
rehabilitation, not redevelopment. This plan, along with their collective support against 
urban renewal, allowed Richmond blacks “to participate in planning their own future,” one 
that excluded white leadership from disenfranchising blacks through urban space.67 
Before Marsh’s rookie term, black Richmonders never successfully opposed urban 
redevelopment. The black working class, led by Henry Marsh, had more say in urban 
politics. Marsh was the third post-Reconstruction black councilman, yet he was the most 
aggressive in shaping urban policy. Oliver Hill in 1948 and B.A. Cephas in 1964 had 
neither the Civil Rights Era circumstances nor the electorate to become serious forces in 
urban affairs. The mobilization against urban redevelopment and black increases in 
electoral politics allowed Marsh to aggressively battle white leadership, whereas Oliver 
Hill and B.A. Cephas could not. Marsh’s first two terms illuminated the transition from 
urban blacks having electoral power to possessing councilmanic power. Richmond’s racial 
dynamic, and Marsh’s ability to capitalize on it, set the stage for Richmond’s most 
important election in city history. 
1968 Election 
The 1968 election was the most polarized election of Richmond’s seventeen-year 
power shift. White leaders used the local media to secure the city council in the 1968 
election. White leadership used racial fears to remind whites of the possibility of black 
leadership controlling the city. The same white leadership used race to convince working-
class blacks that their professionals were no more than slum lords, using race to secure 
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political power through racialized voting solidarity. The results of this election reassured 
white leadership that annexation was the only solution to prevent black leadership from 
controlling City Hall. In the end, the election results not only produced the 1969 
annexation, it became the lynchpin of the 1970 busing crisis.  
This election experienced more voter participation and media attention than ever 
before. By late May, the Crusade helped increase black voter registration by ten percent 
from 1966, increasing the black vote to forty-four percent of the anticipated turnout. These 
numbers confirmed white fears that this election was going to deliver a black majority city 
council. In response, the affluent white voter organization Richmond Forward revitalized 
voting registration in white districts. Using public schools and community centers, 
Richmond Forward helped intensify white voter registration. The goal was to increase 
white voter turnout from thrity percenty to eighty percent of the overall white population. 
The News Leader tracked Richmond Forward’s campaigning and noted that “the 
R[ichmond] F[orward] efforts have been intensified…since the circulation began in the 
Negro community two weeks ago” that blacks could take the city council. Richmond 
Forward and Crusade efforts were so visible that they reached “proportions seldom, if ever, 
undertaken in a Richmond political campaign” Both white and black leaders understood 
that whichever side best mobilized its base would win a majority on the council.68 
The white media used coded race language to secure biracial support against black 
Crusade candidates. Election Day was “one of the most important days in the history of 
Richmond,” according to the Times-Dispatch. If Richmond was to remain an “All-
American City,” its voters would have to ensure the “irresponsible and inexperienced” 
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Crusade candidates were not elected. To the News-Leader, if Crusade candidates won, 
“Richmond will become a permanent black ghetto, a happy hunting ground for ambitious 
political opportunists.” Both media outlets portrayed Crusade leaders as urban slum lords, 
using social change to place themselves at the helm of urban politics. The Crusade was 
running a “cruel hoax on the disadvantaged citizens of” Richmond,” using race leadership 
to garner political power in the increasingly black city. To hide the racial coding with 
economics, the News Leader concluded by alarming white and black voters that “the 
normal exodus to the suburbs will accelerate…leav[ing] a lower tax base for the 
disadvantaged in a time of increased need,” if black leaders becomes the councilmanic 
majority.69  
The black media used race and class to combat the white media’s criticism of black 
leadership. The Richmond Afro-American, a known Crusade mouthpiece, responded to the 
News Leader slum lord claims by reminding Richmonders that the Crusade represented the 
poor it did not exploit them. While adopting Martin Luther King’s Poor Peoples Ticket, 
championing economic rights through jobs and housing for working-class blacks, the Afro-
American illuminated Richmonf Forward’s ties with white business interest. “Richmond 
Forward [is] backed and controlled by the city’s big money czars.”   
The Afro-American went on to say that Richmond Forward: 
“Has been so devoted to pushing its individual and corporate pursuits that it has 
grossly neglected the needs of the people, particularly the city’s working man and 
disadvantaged. RF record would have been impressive in the 40’s. But this is 1968 when 
identity with ‘safe’ colored folk, interracial cocktail parties and mushy smiles by the mayor 
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don’t get it. Today, what is needed is men with guts to take effective action to eradicate 
racism and injustices which are about to destroy not only Richmond but the 
country…Richmond Forward has been unwilling to act against oppression…the record 
shows that it has sometimes tended to promote it. All one needs to do is recall Richmond 
Forward’s race baiting tactics on open housing and annexation.”70 
 
Richmond Forward selected its candidates with the growing black working-class 
voting base in mind. While supporting eight candidates, Richmond Forward left one spot 
open for Richmond’s favorite councilman: Henry Marsh. Richmond Forward implemented 
the eight-man nomination strategy to ensure the two voting blocs they needed to win: 
whites and working-class blacks. Richmond Forward could not endorse Marsh because 
conservative and business friendly whites hated his opposition to urban redevelopment. 
However, Marsh had a strong white liberal following in the city’s Southside. This was in 
part to Marsh being the “the only black guy they heard of,” as well as his strong ties to the 
liberal faction of the Democratic Party. Marsh’s rookie term provided him much support 
city-wide, making a direct campaign for or against him political suicide for Richmond 
Forward.71  
The Crusade’s candidate selection process reflected its stance against white 
business interests, along with fears of white voter backlash. The Crusade shifted away from 
a heavy black slate, in favor of a bi-racial slate. Questions about supporting blacks who did 
not fit the agenda led to the Crusade removing support from incumbent black councilmen 
B.A. Cephas and Winfred Mundle. Both Cephas and Mundle not only supported urban 
redevelopment, they served on housing committees that refused to provide adequate 
housing for black residents. Traditionally seen as go-betweens for white and black leaders, 
Cephas and Mundle’s fates were sealed without Crusade support. Their political success 
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centered on being the black faces of white politicians. Without black support, white 
politicians had no use for Cephas and Mundle in the council.  For the Crusade, rejecting 
Cephas and Mundle, as historian Allan Hammock suggested, proved “blacks could reject 
black candidates who were well-known incumbents and vote for Crusade endorsed white 
candidates,” two being Reverend James Carpenter and Howard Carwile. Moreover, it 
legitimized their claim to work for the poor, given that white and black poverty plagued 
Richmond. Black professionals ensured that their political ascension appeared as socially 
centered ideals involving race and not race based social change. Therefore, liberal whites 
replaced conservative blacks on the Crusade ticket.72   
The highly anticipated 1968 election did not bring about the results the white media 
predicted. On Election Day, July 14, 1968, Richmond did not have anything close to a 
majority black city council. Henry Marsh was the only one of the three incumbent black 
councilmen to win reelection. This had much to do with Richmond Forward not 
campaigning against him, Crusade support for him, and his increased popularity amongst 
white liberals. The white liberal presence was felt more by the return of Howard Carwile 
to the council, winning first place with over fifty-six percent of the electorate. Marsh and 
Carwile were accompanied by a white Reverend of a black church James Carpenter.73 
 The white media wrongly assessed the implications of the election results. The 
News Leader assured white residents that Crusade electoral advances were coming to an 
end because two of the three black incumbents lost their reelection bids. While focusing 
on race, the News Leader neglected to mention that Cephas and Mundle were elected out 
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of office by the same urban blacks who elected them in 1966. Even the Times-Dispatch 
post-election report suggested that Cephas and Mundle’s support of urban redevelopment 
cost them black support. Rather, Marsh had two allies, Carwile and Carpenter, who were 
going to vote his way on almost every measure. This was actually the Crusade’s strongest 
election to date. Black leadership secured three seats for councilmen, guaranteed white 
liberal voters, and had three councilmen who were solely interested in opposing elite white 
councilmanic interests.74  
While the 1968 election featured less black councilmen than the 1966 election, 
urban blacks possessed more electoral power than in years past. Black leadership, through 
its bi-racial slate, helped elect enough councilmen to stop proposals by Richmond Forward 
councilmen, giving black leadership its first ever veto power in the city council. Although 
the Times-Dispatch reported the removal of two black incumbents as “the death of the 
Richmond Crusade for Voters as a major power in the city political structure,” black 
leadership once again increased its political power through electoral gains. The realization 
of what the Crusade accomplished in the 1968 election forced white leaders to broker a 
land and citizen deal with suburban leadership, hoping to thwart the increasing professional 
black influence in city politics.75  
1969 Annexation 
The 1969 annexation culminated the efforts of urban and suburban white leaders 
using their various political agendas to ensure Richmond and its city council remained 
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white. Once completed, the annexation made 44,000 white Chesterfield suburbanites 
Richmond residents at the stroke of midnight on January 1, 1970. This acquisition had 
social and political ramifications. Socially, the annexation sparked suburban unrest, as 
newly-made Richmond residents opposed their new residential status through petitions to 
the Virginia Supreme Court. Suburban unrest was followed by urban unrest between law 
enforcement and black residents, who were the new voting minority. Politically, 
annexation reduced Richmond’s black citizenry from fifty-two percent  to forty-two 
percent , ensuring a white majority city council in the 1970 election. Disdain over the racial 
results of the 1969 annexation, as well as the city council it created afterward, played out 
in education reform, leading to the final stage of Richmond’s racial shift in 1977.  
Urban white leaders made efforts to work with suburban leaders on annexation. 
City Manager Alan Kiepper and Chesterfield Board Member Melvin Burnett met eight 
times between July 16 and September 12, 1968. Despite Kiepper asking for “50,000 
affluent white” people to offset the growing black populace, the subject of the meeting was 
not as important as the places they met. Burnett and Kiepper met in donut shops, houses of 
mutual friends, and small diners, all located in what would be the annexed territory. These 
locations suggest a shifting class relationship between urban and suburban white 
leadership. Traditionally, urban white leadership conducted business in venues like the 
Country Club of Virginia, which excluded blacks and non-elite whites. However, urban 
leaders stepping away from the traditional haven for racial politics illuminated how 
important it was that suburban leadership worked with them to make, according to John 
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Moeser, the “one mind” they both shared into a reality. That reality was the assurance that 
blacks did not control the urban center of the metropolitan area. 76  
Negotiations became complicated when more city and county officials entered the 
discussion. Kiepper and Burnett could not reach a compromise because both sides refused 
to compromise on the number of annexed residents. So, Richmond Mayor Phil J. Bagley 
and Chesterfield Board Member Frederick F. Dietsch entered the annexation discussions. 
Both Dietsch and Bagley represented the extremes of suburban and urban leadership. To 
Dietsch, any annexation of over 30,000 residents “was out of the question.” If 
Chesterfield’s leadership would cede Richmond the 50,000 white residents the council 
wanted, “the court would have to order it.” Mayor Phil Bagley was determined to annex 
50,000 white suburbanites to prevent “the city from going to the niggers,” politically and 
demographically. Bagley foreshadowed the future annexation by proclaiming that “as long 
as I am the Mayor of the City of Richmond, the niggers won’t take over this 
town…[because] niggers are not qualified to run the city.” Dietsch’s and Bagley’s stances 
only complicated discussions between the two sides, forcing the state’s hand in doing what 
they both could not: maintain a white majority in Richmond.77  
Fed up with the annexation stalemate, state powers intervened to force an urban-
suburban solution. The annexation trial resumed on September 24, 1968, with both sides 
farther away from a solution. After Chesterfield Attorney Frederick T. Grey and Richmond 
Planning Director A. Howe Todd finished 1968 in a stalemated court battle, Governor Mills 
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E. Godwin called a special General Assembly session in April of 1969. In this special 
session, the Assembly proposed and passed an amendment to expand city borders to the 
Assembly’s liking in any direction it saw fit, effective January 1, 1970. The bill was only 
voided if a land deal was brokered before the January 1 deadline. Godwin’s measure took 
political power away from both urban and suburban leaders. Now the state decided if and 
how Richmond should grow, as well as Chesterfield’s sociopolitical aftermath.78 
Suburban leadership was convinced Godwin’s bill was a racially motivated 
measure to maintain white leadership in Richmond. The General Assembly, as well as “the 
City of Richmond is only interested in one thing, white votes,” said Chesterfield Delegate 
George Jones. Instead of the state handling Richmond’s affairs, Jones argued suburbanites 
should “appoint the city council if they cannot manage the City of Richmond and they need 
help from us.” Jones finished his speech on the House floor by mentioning “there is a group 
in Richmond that would like to continue the stranglehold control that they have over the 
city.” This group was the city’s affluent white class, and its stranglehold was reassured 
through “keep[ing] more registered white voters than Negro voters.” Despite stating the 
obvious, Governor Godwin, with Assembly members, put both Richmond and Chesterfield 
leadership on notice that either they ensure Richmond remained white or the state would 
do it for them.79 
Urban and suburban leadership responded to Godwin’s bill by settling on the city’s 
territorial expansion. On May 15, 1969, Mayor Phil Bagley and County Board Member 
Irvin Horner met and agreed to Chesterfield relinquishing twenty-three square miles of its 
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northeast border to Richmond, which included 44,000 residents (43,781 white), for $34 
million. Despite dissenting votes from Richmond’s Henry Marsh III, Howard Carwile, 
James Carpenter, and two Chesterfield Board Members, both groups agreed to what would 
be called the Horner-Bagley line. This agreement ensured that the annexation was effective 
on January 1, 1970, nullifying the General Assembly’s annexation amendment.80 
Black opposition to the effects of annexation came in the form of welfare protest. 
The annexation price put public programs under financial strain. The city charter forbade 
the council from borrowing money to annex land, therefore, the $34 million came directly 
out of the city budget. One of the departments impacted most by city-wide cutbacks was 
the welfare office. On October 1, 1969, the city enacted its welfare department budget cut, 
which was planned almost a year prior to accommodate a future annexation purchase. 
Included in the budget cut was the council’s vote to “not increase welfare payments for 
clothes, food, and furniture,” all of which became more expensive as downtown businesses 
relocated to the suburbs. The budget cut not only slashed entitlement payment almost in 
half, it reduced the number of residents who could enroll and stay on the program. With 
annexation, “the city bank account was under a strain,” forcing the council to save money 
wherever they could.81   
 Black residents contested the council’s handling of welfare within the city budget. 
After being told by Welfare Chief Herbert G. Ross that the council’s “instructions were to 
cut costs in his department by $1 million…and that he could not accede to another 
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demand,” black mothers, led by Miss Louretta Johnson and the National Welfare Rights 
Organization, gathered outside of City Hall and the Safety, Health, and Welfare office in 
protest. That night, black residents “packed out” the city council meeting over the welfare 
issue. “Uniformed and plain clothes policemen stood to enforce Mayor Phil Bagley’s rule 
against applause,” as tensions were high between black residents and white leaders. After 
councilmen Marsh, Carwile, and Carpenter requested putting city welfare program under 
federal compliance for grant purposes was denied by all six Richmond Forward 
councilmen, loud “rumbles of discontent” sprang “from the predominantly Negro crowd.” 
One spectator encouraged Mayor Bagley to “sleep well,” knowing his administration was 
arguably the most disfavored by black Richmonders in city history. Black discontent with 
white leadership spilled out of City Hall and into the community, as law enforcement had 
trouble policing black Richmond.82  
Negative police-black encounters following the annexation reflected annexation 
hostility between urban blacks and white leaders. Reports of violent encounters between 
white police officers and black citizens became more frequent as the January 1, deadline 
approached. One hundred and twenty black Richmonders went to City Hall in late October 
to support twenty-one blacks who testified against the Richmond Police Department. 
Residents used an incident, in which a black man was detained by white officers for no 
legal reason, as a forum to publicize their complaints. Citizens claimed the police regularly 
displayed “discourtesy, indifference” to “pickpocketing money from them.” White officers 
responded to urban black complaints with violent threats. Statements like “I’ll blow your 
brains out” reminded blacks that questioning the large police precence in their 
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neighborhood could be fatal. Councilman Carwile believed this trend was a “city problem,” 
as complaints dominated city council discussions. “A big handle of red-necked, 
unreconstructed Dixiecrats and bigots” consistently punished anyone from the “majority 
community,” who would become the minority soon enough. The excessive police force 
appeared to be a physical reminder that whites were taking their city back on January 1, 
1970. “The atmosphere is so built up” from the annexation that it was very difficult for 
“the victim of police brutality to have anybody on their side.”83  
White leadership minimized the obvious community-council problems that arose 
from the annexation. City manager Alan Kiepper addressed Carwile and urban blacks by 
proposing an increase in police patrol over black neighborhoods. Carwile’s “civilian police 
review” board request “discredit[ed] the police,” according to City Manager Kiepper. City 
Manager Alan Kiepper begged the council to release funds for police overtime hours. Since 
Richmond’s street crime “mostly involves blacks,” increased patrol made sense, as police-
black encounters worsened. The measure was passed with three dissenting votes from the 
usual suspects, Marsh, Carwile, and Carpenter. This increased surveillance ensured that 
newly annexed Chesterfield suburbanites felt safe knowing that black neighborhoods were 
“properly” patrolled and controlled by white law enforcement. White control extended to 
law enforcement, as black residents continued to show discontent over the recent 
annexation decision.84 
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Like working-class blacks, the annexation caused suburbanites much discomfort. 
Chesterfield residents petitioned to appeal the annexation, as it was a point of dissension 
between suburban residents and their leadership. While suburban leaders were interested 
in maintaining Richmond’s white majority, the truth is most suburbanites could not care 
less because real estate markets and county lines protected them from Civil Rights Era race 
problems. Chesterfield residents, under the leadership of dissenting Board Member L. Paul 
Byrne, encouraged Crusade president Wilmer Wilson, to sue the city council for violating 
Section V of the Voting Rights Act of 1965 (VRA), given that the annexation switched the 
black voting majority to a minority. Black leaders refused to support any litigation based 
on the VRA because the white influx stabilized the urban economy. After receiving no 
support from Richmond’s black leadership, Chesterfield residents petitioned the Virginia 
Supreme Court of Appeals on their own. The appeal was heard on November 20, 1969, 
and cartupuled the annexation. Chesterfield residents filed one more appeal on December 
19, 1969, but the Virginia Supreme Court rejected it once again. As the year 1969 drew to 
a close, it was clear that the annexed residents were going to be Richmond residents on 
January 1, 1970.85 
The 1969 annexation allowed white city planners to temporarily control black Civil 
Rights Era gains in electoral politics and urban policy. Marsh and Carwile’s urban 
redevelopment opposition, along with the 1968 election, confirmed that urban and 
suburban leaders needed to control the political destabilization caused by the breakdown 
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of Jim Crow. Although Richmond and Chesterfield experienced backlash over the 
annexation, its true effects would be felt in the 1970 election and the subsequent school 
desegregation crisis.  
1970 Election 
The 1969 North Chesterfield annexation, which took effect on January 1, 1970, 
complicated urban politics. Overnight, Richmond not only expanded its southwestern 
border by twenty-three square miles, its white population increased from 108,398 to 
143,857, now fifty-two pecent. Although white politicians saw the annexation as the means 
to retain urban political power, the annexed residents had different political objectives, 
making them a wild card in the 1970 election. White elites, black elites, and annexed 
suburban leaders, all had interconnected interests that complicated their political dealing 
with each other. Despite establishing their own political platform, the annexed suburban 
electorate largely aligned with Richmond’s white leadership. However, the results of this 
election created conflict in the school desegregation saga, which amplified when annexed 
suburbanites came face-to-face with the Civil Rights Era changes Chesterfield County 
previously protected them from, which was school desegregation.86  
The annexed citizens wasted no time in politically mobilizing for the 1970 
councilmanic election. Instead of supporting Richmond Forward, suburbanites formed 
their own political organization called the Team of Progress (TOP). Under the leadership 
of George Jones and Robert Tuttle, both of whom represented Chesterfield in the Virginia 
House Delegates and were in the unique position of competing within urban politics for 
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the first time, the TOP began 1970 by seeking alliances, hoping to get an upper hand on 
Richmond’s established white and black political power structures.87  
Suburban leadership’s first round of negotiations began with the possibility of a 
biracial political alliance. On January 23 1970, TOP members Robert T. Fitzgerald, Roger 
Griffin, and Ronald Livingston, met with Crusade founder Dr. William Thornton about 
forming a political coalition in the upcoming election. The proposed alliance would 
combine the newly annexed white and urban black voting minorities. The coalition could 
have possibly unseated annexation leaders like Councilman James Wheat Jr., Mayor Phil 
Bagley, Councilman Thomas Bliley, Councilman Nathan Forb, Councilwoman Nell B. 
Pusey, and Councilman Morrill Crowe. After a few hours of discussion, Dr. Thornton 
rejected the alliance because he felt the Crusade would not “benefit from a formal alliance” 
with the TOP. Some suspected the proposed alliance would reduced the role black 
professionals had in electoral politics, given that “the Crusade…was seldom on equal 
footing” with white leaders, even within the city council. This proposed alliance was not 
about two powers coming together, but about one power (annexed leadership) attempting 
to use the other power (black professionals) to establish themselves as urban political 
figures.88  
With no intentions of fighting a three-way electoral battle, TOP leaders sought an 
alliance with Richmond Forward. After failing to see eye-to-eye with Dr. Thornton, TOP 
leadership met with current Richmond Forward councilmen Nathan Forbes and Thomas 
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Bliley, offering to electorally achieve what the annexation sought out do: to keep 
Richmond’s city council majority white. “I don’t want to see Richmond become an all-
black city…fear of the city going black relates very much to the present school crisis we 
have,” said future councilman and RF candidate Henry L. Valentine to TOP leaders. After 
various meetings, the TOP split into two factions. Those who felt Richmond Forward 
intended to use annexed votes to retain power, while not excluding them from the economic 
and race issues the city faced, formed Richmond United (RU). Others who saw Richmond 
Forward as the only means of obtaining political influence joined the TOP/Richmond 
Forward coalition under the TOP umbrella.89   
This was the first election since 1962 that featured two white voter organizations 
with conflicting electoral interests. RU represented suburban annexed whites who endorsed 
any candidate that opposed the 1969 annexation. Its support ranged from Crusade 
incumbents Henry Marsh III, James Carpenter, and Howard Carwile, to new candidates 
like Robert Shiro and Oats McCullen. TOP encompassed two groups: suburban whites who 
supported urban white leadership and wealthy whites from Richmond Forward. TOP 
endorsed pro-annexation leadership like Thomas Bliley and Nathan Forb, as well as “the 
new white guys” such as Metropolitan National Bank President William Daniel and real 
estate developer and chemical engineer Dr. Wayland Rennie.90 
The Crusade used the split white vote to nominate another biracial slate, while 
introducing new working-class community leaders to the councilmanic platform. While 
endorsing the incumbent trifecta of Marsh, Carwile, and Carpenter, the Crusade nominated 
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black working-class leaders like Walter T. Kenny and Curtis Holt. Postal worker and 
national vice-president of the American Postal Workers Union, Kenny ran his campaign 
on improving public schools and the black community’s involvement in urban politics. 
Head of the Creighton Court Civic Association (voter registration), Curtis Holt was an East 
End community organizer who worked with Crusade leadership throughout the 1960s to 
keep their electoral connection with the working poor. Neither Kenny or Holt won council 
seats, however Holt’s defeat germinated with the 1969 annexation to bring about 1977 
majority black city council.91   
The 1970 election proved that the diverse interests, derived from the 1969 
annexation, prevented black and suburban leadership from gaining control over the city 
council. TOP helped elect six of the nine councilmen with the fifty-eight percent white 
majority. None of the annexed citizens’ candidates, as well as the Crusade’s working-class 
black candidates, won a council seat. The Crusade and RU helped reelect the same three 
councilmen in 1970 that the Crusade did alone in 1968: Carwile, Marsh, and Carpenter. 
Despite “many whites in the newly annexed area show[ing] their resentment having been 
acquired by the city” through not allying with Richmond Forward, they did not have nearly 
enough votes to secure their own councilmanic majority. The RU-Crusade support for 
Marsh, Carwile, and Carpenter resonated in all three receiving the highest overall votes. If 
a suburban white-urban black political partnership happened on January 23, 1970, the 
annexed citizens and black leadership would have controlled the 1970 city council. 
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However, RU and the Crusade’s inability to ally resulted in affluent whites securing a 
sizable councilmanic majority once again, thanks in part to the 1969 annexation.92  
The stunted urban black political growth set the stage for Richmond’s school 
desegregation crisis. Annexed residents did not enter the city as neutral observers in 
councilmanic politics or social life. Like urban blacks, annexed suburbanites had their own 
vision of post-Jim Crow Richmond. Suburbanites wanted protective municipal separation 
from the growing black population. Hence, they formed their own voter organization, only 
supporting leaders who wished to de-annex them back into the suburbs. After losing their 
bid for political influence, annexed suburbanites sought to make Civil Rights Era 
Richmond  difficult for white leaders to control. Suburban resistance to the annexation 
culminated in their own form of “Massive Resistance” to school desegregation, which sped 
up urban black ascendancy to the city council.   
Busing 
Prior to the 1970 busing decree, three events complicated the political drama caused 
by Richmond’s unstable post-Jim Crow political environment. First, segregationist Judge 
John Butzner stepped down, and was replaced with Judge Robert Merhige. Second, the 
Supreme Court ruled Freedom of Choice, or de facto segregation, unconstitutional. Third, 
the annexation of 1969 placed over 10,000 suburban white students within Richmond City 
Public Schools. White suburban and black urban resistance to busing was a piece in the 
metropolitan areas’ multifaceted relationship with race and space. The fulfillment of 
Brown, by 1970, shattered the remnants of Richmond’s “Separate City” model. Judge 
Merhige ensured Richmond’s generational physically segregated public school system 
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ended. This Jim Crow breakdown caused upheaval, as neither majority (working-class 
blacks and suburban whites) wished to participate in redefining their relationship to each 
other through education reform. The educational drama between 1968 and 1970 
complicated Richmond’s racial transition because annexed white dissenters fought school 
desegregation with school re-segregation, forcing Judge Merhige to consolidate 
metropolitan politics into a unitary body through its school system by 1971.   
Judge Robert Mehrige’s history with forced integration all but guaranteed that 
white and black students would be forcibly integrated. Federal Judge John Butzner, the 
man who ruled Freedom of Choice constitutional, stepped down and was replaced with 
Judge Robert Merhige in 1968. Because Judge Merhige spent much of 1967 and 1968 
desegregating Southern Virginia school systems, most notably using busing and city-
county consolidation in Emporia City, many saw him as a liberal judge. However, unlike 
some of his contemporaries, Merhige “was not one to be interested in deeply theoretical 
notions about statutory interpretation or constitutional interpretation;” however he 
encountered the law with “a sense of human dignity” according to law professor Mary Tate. 
To law professor and former collegue Ron Bacigal, Merhige often saw “what was right and 
was what the law as one in the same,” when it came to Civil Rights legislation. Therefore, 
when Merhige enforced Brown through busing, he did so with the understanding that it 
was not only lawful, but that it was also what he felt was morally right.93 
The defeat of Freedom of Choice put Judge Robert Merhige into contact with 
Richmond’s public schools. The last leg of legal de facto segregation died thirty miles 
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southeast of Richmond. On May 15, 1968, the Supreme Court ruled all Freedom of Choice 
plans to be in violation of Brown in the Green v. County School Board of New Kent case. 
In New Kent County, similar to Richmond, the majority of whites and blacks used Freedom 
of Choice to stay in segregated schools. Therefore, resident NAACP member Charles C. 
Green used the County’s Freedom of Choice Plan to prove that its offspring, de facto 
segregation, was in violation of Brown because it produced a racially identifiable school 
system. Serving as the Federal Judge in Richmond, Judge Mehrige helped to create another 
desegregation plan for city schools. Having earned an unfavorable reputation in the famous 
Greenville County School consolidation, Judge Merhige received threatening, 
sympathetic, and desperate letters from whites hoping he would not use busing or 
consolidation to racially balance Richmond’s public schools.94  
White Richmonders’ hate letters revealed their collective fear of Judge Merhige 
removing yet another remnant of the city’s Jim Crow culture: racially segregated public 
schools. Hate mail, later named “Kook Files,” often revolved around the harm of bi-racial 
contact between white and black students. Most of the harm stemmed from sex. One 
mother begged Judge Merhige to spare Richmond public school system from desegregation 
because she feared “the type of Negro” children who came from parents who refused “to 
get married” and “keep having children with every Dick and Jane that comes along.” The 
white mother’s criticism of the black family structure and sexual promiscuity reflected her 
deeply rooted notion of blacks being too uncivilized to share the same classrooms with 
white students. Some whites took their dehumanizing sexual stereotypes to the extreme by 
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calling black boys “wired-haired cannibals” who loved nothing more than to rape young 
white women. Another parent went as far as to accuse Judge Merhige and his wife of 
having sexual relations with “niggers.” While most letters warranted the name Kook Files, 
some parents expressed general concern for their children’s wellbeing. One mother claimed 
she was forced to pick up a second job to pay for private school because she feared her 
children being mistreated by the black students who hated white people. Through these 
letters and many more received by School Board President Virginia Crockford, white 
Richmonders revealed their deeply rooted fears and hatred associated with the breakdown 
of Jim Crow. These racial fears were tested when they were faced with forced integration.95 
Seeing Freedom of Choice as the last leg of Richmond’s school segregation, the 
local NAACP struck what looked like the final blow against school segregation: Bradley 
v. Richmond School Board. The timing for this lawsuit was key to its longevity and impact. 
Had this lawsuit been filed before 1968, chances are it would have not been as effective. 
Not until after the annexation took place, which added over 10,000 white students to the 
sixty-eight percent black school district, did the NAACP reopen the 1962 lawsuit on March 
10, 1970. The appointment of Judge Merhige, the illegality of Freedom of Choice, and the 
increased white student body, made the Bradley v. Richmond City School Board suit more 
likely to achieve racial integration in public schools.96  
Political issues made this version of Bradley more powerful than the 1962 suit. The 
council’s white majority understood that they could not successfully fight integration any 
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longer. The 1962 Bradley suit came before Freedom of Choice, when statewide tokenism 
was at its strongest. The 1970 Bradley suit came during intensified political drama over the 
annexation and the council’s inability to institute Freedom of Choice. Financially, the 
council could not afford another lengthy fight against school desegregation. The over one 
million dollars in legal debt from the annexation, and Crusade councilmen Marsh, 
Carpenter, and Carwile blocking all council proposed measures to borrow money, kept the 
city’s legal budget to a minimum. If public schools were to survive, they needed federal 
funding which hinged upon federal compliance with desegregation. With city council 
approval, the Richmond School Board asked the U.S. Department of Health, Education, 
and Welfare (HEW) to devise desegregation plans that not only brought the city in 
compliance with Brown, but enable the Richmond Public School systems to receive much 
needed federal funds.97 
It was clear to Judge Merhige that ending school segregation meant breaking the 
geographic barrier that sustained it: space. By the summer of 1970, the biggest obstacle 
preventing Richmond public schools from federal compliance was segregated housing. So, 
Judge Mehrige allowed the HEW and the Urban Team to present methods for school 
desegregation. The Urban Team and HEW decided that Richmond’s public schools would 
never be in compliance unless the white suburbs were forced to participate in a 
metropolitan busing scheme. Public schools resided within neighborhood boundaries, most 
of which were racially segregated. This made mobility the issue, as blacks who wished to 
send their children to white schools could not access public or private transportation to 
white neighborhoods. White families, even those who lived in predominantly black areas, 
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refused to send their children to schools with predominately black students and black 
faculty. To Merhige, the solution was simple. Removing spatial barriers meant utilizing 
busing.98 
Judge Merhige refused to accept any desegregation plan that did not fully utilize 
mass transportation to break the spatial barrier Jim Crow created. Distance and cost both 
factored into the equation. Most black residents lived in Richmond’s East End and 
Northside. Urban whites lived in the West End and Southside of the city. This meant any 
approved busing scheme had to be implemented across the sixty-three square mile city. 
HEW’s desegregation proposal, Plan I, included busing in all neighborhoods except the 
all-black East End and all-white suburban annexed Southside. Since Plan I left two huge 
sectors of the city untouched, providing residential safe zones, Judge Merhige rejected Plan 
I. Plan II, devised by the city council and school board, allowed for complete cross-town 
busing of every neighborhood, yet it relied exclusively on federal funds. Judge Merhige 
rejected Plan II because it levied no financial responsibly on the same city that blatantly 
disobeyed the law. As a compromise, Judge Merhige accepted Plan III on August 7, 1970. 
It was a temporary plan that bused mainly East End and Northside blacks to Southside 
schools.99 
Suburban whites felt victimized and protested what they felt was a violation of their 
consumer rights. Annexed residents formed the Citizens Against Busing (CAB) coalition 
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under the leadership of Chesterfield preacher John Book. CAB petitioned Governor 
Linwood Holt to issue a state ordinance repealing Judge Merhige’s busing plan. However, 
state and local support for busing was evident as Governor Holt and TOP councilman 
Mayor Thomas J. Bliley, who both vehemently opposed busing, asked annexed citizens to 
“obey the law and cooperate.” The CAB organized drive-ins around Capital Square and 
Richmond Arena, protesting the “the combining of all races by force” in public schools. 
Annexed residents’ victimization was best explained by one mother who mentioned that 
“before I was occupied by the City of Richmond, I was relatively happy and had no serious 
problems.” Suburbanites “flee to the suburbs and so avoid the problems” of the city. “The 
Problems” being Jim Crow’s demise. CAB’s message was clear.  Annexed suburbanites 
wanted residential, political, and educational separation from Richmond’s white elites and 
black residents. The annexation and Judge Merhige’s busing ruling violated their Civil 
Rights Era agenda, making suburbanites “second-class citizens” to the same blacks who 
were just a few years before, legally second-class citizens.100  
Suburban protest turned into massive resistance at the beginning of the 1970-71 
school year. On the first day of school, suburban parents illegally withheld over 5,000 
children from Richmond’s Public Schools’ busing plan. Few white dissenters, mostly in 
the West End, legally removed their children from Richmond Public Schools, like Judge 
Merhige who reassigned his own son to preparatory school. As historian Matthew Lassiter 
noted, the majority of white dissention came from the annexed Southside. Stories of 
Southside families renting additional apartments and using fake addresses in Chesterfield 
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and Henrico to avoid busing ran rampant throughout the local media. The protest impacted 
Richmond Public Schools, as by November of 1970, the fifty-eight percent black student 
majority expanded to seventy percent in half of a semester.101 
Working-class blacks resisted citywide busing as well. Black Richmonders 
withheld 800 children from public schools in defiance of the busing order. “We want 
neighborhood schools the same as white folk” said black parent and News Leader reporter 
Al Johnson. Black mother Mrs. Shirley Martin told the Wall Street Journal that black 
Richmonders accepted busing, “but we don’t like it.” Mrs. Martin later raised the question 
of “why can’t my kids go to school near my house?” Many of the busing assignments put 
black students in white schools, instead of the other way around. Urban blacks did not want 
their children “to be bused all over the place” to protect white students from going into 
black neighborhood schools. Although the school board and the city council saw forced 
busing as in “the mutual interest of the entire metropolitan area,” on this and the 
annexation, urban blacks aligned with suburban whites in opposition. This working-class 
black and suburban white resistance was bigger than race. Rather, as historian Robert Pratt 
alluded to, their defiance highlighted a “natural fear of the unknown” world Civil Rights 
Era changes were creating. The breakdown of Jim Crow scared the working-class black 
and suburban white majority, forcing them to react in utter defiance.102 
Because of white and black defiance, Judge Merhige consolidated Richmond’s 
race-centered political crisis through education. By December of 1970, busing became 
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socially and economically unfeasible. Judge Merhige’s busing order left a $600,000 
transportation bill on the city budget, along with the outstanding legal fees from the 
annexation trial. In light of the recent failure, the local NAACP, headed by Henry Marsh, 
encouraged the Bradley plaintiffs to request a consolidated school system with Henrico 
and Chesterfield County. Since Chesterfield and Henrico served as safe zones against 
Judge Merhige’s busing order, including both localities in Bradley would bring about the 
fullest execution of Brown. After the Bradley plaintiffs requested it on December 14, 1970, 
the Richmond School Board and City Council asked that both Henrico and Chesterfield be 
brought into the Bradley suit, which Judge Merhige granted..103 
The aftermath of the busing failure, in light of the 1969 annexation, set the stage 
for two federal court battles that entrenched the city’s sociopolitical stability throughout 
the 1970s. Failed cross-town busing did not end Civil Rights Era changes in Richmond. 
Rather, it encouraged Judge Merhige to further complicate Richmond’s political landscape. 
Richmond’s past sins of delaying Brown haunted the newly annexed suburbanites, who 
had no intentions of helping the Bradley plaintiffs bring about the fulfillment of Civil 
Rights education reform. The educational battle encompassed the city’s overall political 
battle about the outlook of Richmond as the racially separate city became destabilized.  
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Conclusion 
Black leadership’s 1960-66 political strength was minimized during the Middle 
Years of 1967-70. However, urban white leadership’s thwarting of black political power 
only complicated Richmond’s political landscape. The city’s racial transition originally 
encompassed white and black leadership vying for control over post-Jim Crow Richmond. 
After the 1969 annexation, Richmond’s political battle became the metropolitan areas’ war 
over the racial and political outlook of the capital city. As annexed residents were dragged 
into Richmond’s urban crisis, they maintained their own agenda of suburban separation 
apart from white and black leadership. The final stage of this transition represented the end 
of elite white control over city politics. Working-class black and suburban white attacks on 
white leaders inevitably forced affluent whites to vacate any chance of preventing 
Richmond from becoming a black city council.  
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Chapter 3: The Beginning of the End 1971-1977 
The final stage of Richmond’s Civil Rights Era racial transition happened between 
1971 and 1977. The Bradley and Holt trials ended elite white control of the city council 
and public education. During these years, elite white control of the city became more 
susceptible to challenges from urban blacks and suburban whites. Every political group, 
whether it be middle-class blacks, working-class blacks, or middle-class whites, had 
varying interpretations for how Civil Rights Era Richmond should operate. Circumstances  
created strange political bedfellows that ultimately eroded the political power away from 
urban white leaders by the end of both Bradley in 1974 and Holt in 1977.104   
Although Richmond received a black majority city council by 1977, black politics 
were far from monolithic. Through Bradley and Holt, both working and middle-class black 
leaders fought separate issues for separate reasons, bringing about a similar outcome: a 
black-majority city, majority black council, and a black mayor. While black professionals 
supported Bradley and school desegregation, working-class black leadership supported 
Holt and de-annexation. Both black constituencies had their own visions for Civil Rights 
Richmond, and their separate fights placed them at odds with each other, as suburban and 
elite white interests used this black class breakdown for their own agendas as well. 
Although the city was about “ninety percent divided,” in that “there were few social 
organizations that were integrated,” social conflict over school desegregation and the 1969 
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annexation integrated Richmond’s political environment so much that white elites followed 
suburbanites by politically vacating Richmond by 1977, creating the black majority city.105 
Bradley 
Judge Merhige’s busing experiment furthered the city’s racial divide. By January 
of 1971, just six months after city-wide busing was approved, the black public school 
population rose to seventy percent after being lowered below sixy percent by the 
annexation. White and black urban residents separately opposed integrated schools. Black 
parents withheld their children from integrated schools, while white parents relocated to 
the suburbs. An anonymous black women noted, in an interview with Robert Pratt, that by 
Christmas of 1970, her West End neighborhood switched from 90% white to 90% black 
once busing was approved in August of 1970. School Board president Virginia Crockford 
mentioned that once Judge Merhige’s busing order was implemented, white families fled 
the Richmond PTA’s and neighborhoods in “droves.” White flight ranged from black 
students victimizing white children on school buses, to the disapproval of the school 
board’s support for busing. The defiance, by both sides, illuminated that the majority of 
Richmonders were not willing or ready to defy the Jim Crow culture they grew up in.106 
The hypocrisy shown by black and white leadership may have fueled much of the 
defiance to busing. Despite Governor Linwood Holton sending his children to desegregated 
public schools, some black and white professionals, with the financial means, sent their 
children to private schools the minute busing was adopted. “The upper-class black kids left 
instantly when those children came in,”  according to former Councilman Wayland Rennie. 
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“Even the Urban League president [Randolph C. Kendell] sent his children to private 
school “the minute those children came in.” Those children being “the [black] children 
from the [East End] housing projects.” Although some white Richmonders “wished [they] 
had a realistic sense to do it,” before busing took place, many within white leadership 
enrolled their children in private school afterward. Most white councilmen sent their 
children to private schools while working almost every day on peacefully implementing 
public school integration. This hypocrisy did not go unquestioned as Judge Merhige had to 
answer to the public about sending his son, Mark Merhige, to St. Christopher’s, an all-
white preparatory school. “When I’m on the bench, I’m on the bench… and when I’m at 
home, I’m just a father. Mark attends a private school because that’s where I think he can 
get a better education, and I make no apologies for it.” While it is tough to sufficiently 
assess the complete social impact of black and white leadership’s private school choices, 
busing protest surely had more to do with hypocricy from urban leadership, as many of 
their children never experienced public school integration.107 
Judge Merhige and urban white leaders agreed on using suburbanites to achieve 
their separate agendas, thus they developed Bradley by including Henrico and Chesterfield 
into the suit. All things considered, the recent cross-town busing failure had less to do with 
black and white leadership sending their children to private school and more to do with 
municipal borders undermining Judge Merhige’s order. Judge Merhige proposed a 
metropolitan consolidation back in June of 1970, given his familiarity with it in Greenville 
and Brunswick Counties. In Richmond,“bus-dodging and white flight to the 
suburbs…[left] consolidation as the only course for true integration.” Thinking similarly 
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to Judge Merhige, the Richmond School Board and city council blamed suburbanites for 
the busing disaster. “School division boundaries created and maintained by the cooperative 
efforts of local and central state officials” create[d] racially identifiable schools and 
Richmond’s biracial community, according to city attorneys. Richmond’s white leaders 
and Judge Merhige shared a similar taste for involving suburbanites into urban politics. 
While Judge Merhige cared about desegregating schools, white leadership used Bradley, 
like the 1961 merger, 1964 annexation attempt, and 1969 annexation to convert 
suburbanites into controllable political currency that benefited elite white control over 
Richmond.108 
Suburban leadership immediately recognized the quasi-partnership between 
affluent whites and Judge Merhige. After Judge Merhige included both Henrico and 
Chesterfield in the Bradley case, both counties filed requests for the removal of Judge 
Merhige. Both county attorneys reasoned that Judge Merhige included the suburbs in 
Richmond’s busing crisis because of “a personal bias or pre-justice either against” 
suburban leaders. Judge Merhige’s dislike for suburbanites became clear, according to the 
removal request, when he wrote: “if free citizens exercised their right to move from a 
troubled community to one that offers peace, then the trouble they fled should be packed 
up and sent to them.” The partnership conspiracy became apparent when Judge Merhige 
wrote a letter to the Bradley attorneys “in which he suggested that it might be appropriate 
for the defendant school board to discuss with the appropriate officer the contiguous 
counties as to the feasibility or possibility of consolidation of school districts,” according 
to Chesterfield attorneys. This letter was twofold, because it suggested Judge Merhige’s 
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sympathy with urban leaders, while suggesting a partnership between the plaintiffs and 
himself. Despite the evidence, the removal request was denied, forcing suburban leadership 
to fight the very real Merhige-Bradley attorney coalition that appeared before their very 
eyes.109 
Suburban leadership’s inability to remove Judge Merhige or themselves from the 
lawsuit allowed the council and Judge Merhige to use suburban resistence for political 
gains. Judge Merhige approved the unitary school system in April of 1971, and on January 
5, 1972, he approved an inter-jurisdictional busing plan effective for the 1972-1973 
academic school year. Judge Merhige single-handedly broke “the product of private 
racism” which were the municipal boundaries that allowed suburban whites to disobey his 
busing order. This consolidation cemented Judge Merhige’s legacy, as Matthew Lassiter 
suggested, because successfully removing Jim Crow from the Confederate capital’s school 
systems made Bradley “the most important school desegregation landmark since Brown.” 
Simultaneously, suburban leaders were ordered to “establish a cooperative school 
operation with Richmond.” Richmond’s white leadership successfully linked the suburbs 
and city through Judge Merhige’s order, as according to the ruling, Chesterfield and 
Henrico leaders were required to cooperate with Richmond leadership politically, instead 
of merely negotiating with them.110 
The national media weighed in on Judge Merhige’s decision. U.S. World News 
supported Judge Merhige’s decision. With consolidation, “there is no point of whites 
moving out of the city,” said William L. Taylor Director of the Center for National Policy 
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Review at Catholic University. He, along with NAACP Legal Defense Councilor Jack 
Greenburg, supported Judge Merhige’s landmark decision because consolidation went “far 
beyond the desegregation of a large city school system,” it established the judicial 
precedent of de facto segregation being unconstitutional. To Taylor and Greenburg, the 
“predominantly white school system[s] in…surrounding counties [were] the result of 
discriminatory actions by both the state and local governments” of Jim Crow Virginia. 
Thus, they supported Judge Merhige’s consolidation, as it was the only way to implement 
Brown in the Confederate capital.111  
Judge Merhige gained support from the most unlikely of Richmond residents. There 
were three categories of local support for consolidation: those who believed in the vitality 
of public schools, those wished to prevent white flight, and those who wished to fix 
Richmond’s longstanding racial divide. Public school advocates, or the Citizens for 
Exceptional Public Schools (CEPS), endorsed the “smooth transition” from separate to 
unitary school districts because they believed in public education. Enemies of white flight 
backed consolidation because they belived it would protect their “wonderful capital city 
from becoming a ghetto city [because of] white citizens rush[ing] to the counties to avoid 
desegregation.” The minority of Judge Merhige supporters saw the larger implications of 
the unitary school district. Robert Benzia used his hometown of Princeton, New Jersey, to 
shed light on school consolidation. “We still have our social problems” in Princeton, but it 
is because of school consolidation that “people no longer think in terms of segregated 
schools.” Judge Merhige’s supporters were not united on much besides the consolidation 
results. Unifying the school districts kept schools open, deterred white flight, and ensured 
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that racial conflict did not result in racial separation. Perhaps the disjointedness of Judge 
Merhige’s supporters, as Lassiter noted, ensured that local support “struggled to gain 
traction.” Nevertheless, Judge Merhige’s decision united the most unlikely of people, all 
of whom felt that political consolidation was the only way to achieve their various visions 
for Civil Rights Era Richmond.112 
Support for consolidation did not outweigh the majority of opposition from fear. 
The Citizens Against Busing (CAB), West End Concerned Parents and Friends, and the 
East End PTA, openly opposed metropolitan consolidated busing. Some referred to Judge 
Merhige’s ruling as communism and a violation of civil rights, while others lamented that 
neighborhood schools protected their “different socioeconomic values” from the blacks 
who would be bused into their neighborhood. “I’ll go to jail if I have to; I’ll move to the 
Algannies if I have to; I’ll move to South Africa, I’m tired of living by minority rule,” 
declaired one Chesterfield father. One Henrico mother claimed that busing enabled 
“group[s] of young hoodlums… [who were] roving bands of non-students and dropouts” 
from black neighborhoods to victimize white children. White opposition, regardless of 
location, was very real and it prevented any legitimate chance of Judge Merhige 
implementing his January ruling.113 
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White opposition materialized into legal and illegal acts of resistance. Suburban 
and urban white dissenters held a 108 mile motorcade, of over 4,000 people, to Washington 
DC in protest of the recent federal ruling. Urban and suburban whites shouted "Save Our 
Freedom” at acting Attorney General Richard G. Kleindienst to reverse the order of “two-
thirds-black city school system to merge with two largely white suburban county systems, 
through more busing.” Chesterfield Board of Supervisors Irvin Horner led several rallies 
in the annexed suburb under the moniker “The Peoples Revolt.” “Richmond can rot in hell” 
said one Henrico resident while supporting the anti-busing rally. County residents did not 
stop at civil protest. Judge Mehrige’s life was repeatedly threatened through phone calls 
and residential vandalism. Threats increased so much that Judge Merhige sent his family 
away while federal marshals surveillanced his home twenty four hours a day.114 
Law Professor Philip B. Kurland white resentment to argue against the merits of 
Judge Merhige’s consolidation in the U.S. Court of Appeals. On April 10, 1972, the United 
States Court of Appeals, headed by Judge Clement F. Haynsworth, Jr., heard Chesterfield 
and Henrico’s case against Judge Mehrige’s assessment that Henrico’s and Chesterfield’s 
borders were “newly drawn” and “racially motivated,” creating racially segregated 
schooling. Special Counselor Philip B. Kurland, who represented both Chesterfield and 
Henrico Counties, argued that Judge Merhige’s ruling was a “logical fallacy,” as county 
lines were established well before public schools. Despite private property owners 
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instituting de facto segregation, the counties themselves had no racist policies limiting the 
influx of black citizens. Kurland argued that Judge Merhige’s consolidation was in fact 
institutionalized racism. Labeled “white supremacy in the classroom,” Kurkland 
maintained that Judge Mehrige’s ruling assumed that “black children are to excel 
academically” only in the presence of a white majority. Instead of attacking the overall 
significance of Judge Merhige’s ruling, that being the removal of racially segregated 
education through suburban-urban cooperation, Kurkland used racist notions of black 
inferiority to oppose the legality of consolidation.115 
The Appeals Court agreed with suburban leadership. The U.S. Court of Appeals 
overturned the consolidation with a vote of five to one on June 5, 1972. According to the 
court, Judge Merhige had no legal justification for “realistically plac[ing] on the counties 
the responsibility for the effect that inner city decay has had on the public schools of 
Richmond.” The “little action, if any, the counties may have seen to have taken to keep 
blacks out,” was not enough to force them to form an unwanted union with Richmond city. 
The court suggested that if Judge Merhige wanted to reverse Richmond’s long history of 
segregation, he should use something other than schooling. “A school case, like a vehicle, 
can carry only a limited amount of baggage,” in that there were real limits to Civil Rights 
social change, and Judge Merhige’s ruling exceeded them. Using unitary schools to break 
“the cycle of poverty and the policy of containing blacks within urban ghettos” would not 
be done through forcing urban and suburban leadership to share similar school systems.116  
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Judge Merhige and the Bradley attorneys’ last hopes for an urban/suburban unified 
school system were ravished by the Supreme Court.  The Bradley attorneys appealed the 
Court of Appeals decision, only to have the Supreme Court not levy a ruling on the 
consolidation. The four-to-four stalemate was caused by former School Board President, 
Supreme Court Justice Lewis F. Powell, Jr., recusing himself from the case. Many 
suggested, like Reverend Benjamin Campbell, that “it wouldn’t have mattered if he had 
not excused himself.” Justice Powell, Jr.’s record as the School Board President, and his 
personal racial bias, did not lead any to suggest that he would have ruled in favor of the 
Bradley plaintiffs. Although the stalemate upheld the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals 
decision, Bradley did not die in Richmond, it died in Detroit. Milliken v. Bradley, which 
resembled Bradley v. Richmond, struck down any constitutional justification for federal 
city-suburb school consolidation. Justice Powell, Jr. did not recuse himself from this case, 
as he levied the deciding vote making it five-to-four against consolidation. With the 
Supreme Court removing constitutional protection from Judge Merhige’s ruling, 
Richmond schools continued cross-town busing, which did little more than send black 
children to black schools until 1986.117 
After the Supreme Court secured suburban borders from any forced political 
coalition with the city, white residents and their school-aged children, poured out of 
Richmond. Between 1970 and 1974, Richmond’s white school population dropped from 
thirty-five percent to just twenty-five percent, reflecting a 7,782 white student decrease in 
just eight semesters. The integration process black professionals started in 1960, came to 
fruition by 1974; however, it did not look necessarily as they envisioned it. Although there 
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were three black school board members, and by 1976 Richmond’s first black 
superintendent Richard C. Hunter assumed office, the school system was devoid of any 
real racial integration. From 1970 to 1986, when cross-town busing was removed, 
Richmond’s white student population dwindled to just thirteen percent of the overall 
population. The black middle-class effort, beginning in 1960, did not reform urban 
education, as much as it forced whites to covertly seek other means of separation. While 
some affluent blacks sent their children to private and suburban public schools, most had 
to deal with the de facto segregated school system that Warren and both Bradley cases 
created.118 
Holt 
The results of Curtis Holt v. City of Richmond marked the end of the Civil Rights 
Era in Richmond. This seven-year case produced strange political bedfellows, who made 
alliances across racial boundaries, seeking similar results for different reasons. Working-
class black leader Curtis Holt wanted to infiltrate the city council, something previously 
reserved for black professionals. However, the annexation, he believed, prevented him and 
other working-class leadership from winning the 1970 councilmanic election. Holt’s 
attempt to infiltrate urban leadership, highlighted long-standing class issues within black 
Richmond. Middle-class blacks wanted electoral support from men like Curtis Holt; 
however, black professionals blocked Holt from traditional channels of political power 
because he was mildly educated, he was a man of little financial means, and for some “he 
wasn’t in the right church” according to author Benjamin Hill.  
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Like Bradley, Holt v. City of Richmond began with Curtis Holt’s discontent over 
the 1969 annexation. Most Crusade candidates had little chance at electoral success in the 
1970 election. The most doubtful of the Crusade nominees was Curtis Holt. Unlike fellow 
candidiate Walter T. Kenny, working-class black postal worker with middle-class and 
Democratic Party ties, Curtis Holt was mildly educated, unemployed, and had few political 
connections to white or black leadership. Out of all the 1970 candidates, Holt finished 
seventeenth out of twenty-eight. From the perspective of black leaders, white leaders, or 
annexed residents, Holt’s campaign was a failure from the beginning. His lack of formal 
education showed as he often “said peoples instead of people…black leadership was 
embarrassed of Holt.” Even historian John Moeser suggested that removing the 47,000 
annexed white votes, all eight of the additional candidates, and distributing the remaining 
votes among the twenty one remaining candidates, “it is highly doubtful that Holt would 
have been among the top nine candidates.” However, Curtis Holt believed the 1969 
annexation ruined his councilmanic bid, thus he attacked it in court.119  
Curtis Holt’s ability to serve both working and middle-class black agendas began 
his political ascendancy. Despite low economic and educational status, Holt was a conduit 
between black leadership and their working-class voters. After a construction accident 
rendered him permanently disabled, Holt became a resident of the Creighton Court 
Housing Projects in the 1950s. After his accident, Holt entered politics by gaining the trust 
of both black middle and working classes. For working-class blacks, Holt appeared as the 
man of the people. After the city council refused to put a traffic light in front of Creighton 
Court Housing Projects, on Nine Mile Road, Curtis Holt spent every weekday afternoon 
                                                          
119 1970 Councilmanic Election Results; Moeser and Dennis, Politics of Annexation, 143; and Interview with 
John Moeser, January 5, 2016.  
100 
 
 
 
directing traffic so black children could safely get off the school bus. Holt used his display 
of communal leadership to unite working-class blacks into the Grassroots Coalition. In this 
coalition, Holt helped register East End black voters for the Crusade to use throughout the 
1960s. In one election, his organization helped register over 3,000 voters alone. Holt’s 
community efforts, and mobilization tactics, made him an important man in the black 
community by 1970.120 
The class differences illuminated by the 1969 annexation, forced Holt to split from 
black leaders. Holt wished to sue the city council immediately following the 1970 council 
election however, the local NAACP refused to take up his case. “They gave me the 
runaround…they’re all so busy…some didn’t even return my phone calls,” said Holt. This 
only affirmed his and other blacks’ suspicions that “the power structure is only using 
middle-class blacks to continue to isolate the grassroots blacks in order to keep the city 
running in the hands of the power structure.” Holt’s opposition to annexation brought out 
the class disparities that the Crusade was able to bypass in the mid-1960s. Moreover, 
working-class blacks supported Holt, as the lawsuit separated him from Crusade 
leadership. “What I can’t understand is what makes a black politician think that once he is 
elected to office, all he has to do is just sit back and wait until his people elect him again 
and again,” argued one Holt supporter. She highlighted how opposition to annexation made 
black class relations complex because “some of them [middle-class blacks], a poor black 
person cannot even present a problem to, because if they have ever had their problem they 
don’t have it now.” Because Holt refused to drop his case against the city, for what he felt 
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was an illegal annexation, he and black leadership grew apart. This alianed Holt from the 
same black leadership he helped gain power throughout the 1960s.121   
Holt’s split from Crusade leadership exposed deeper divides in Richmond’s black 
community. Richmond’s black community often “imitated white class divisions, but with 
“greater anxiety,” according to author Benjamin Hill. Richmond, more than any other city 
in Virginia, had rigid class systems. Poor and middle-class whites in Richmond’s Southside 
and wealthy West End whites had little to nothing in common, other than being white. 
Richmond’s black community had class issues however, Jim Crow Era racism united them 
because middle-class blacks lived amongst their working-class counterparts. As Jim Crow 
fell, through voting rights and school desegregation, class disparity became more visible. 
Black professionals were able to buy homes during urban redevelopment, whereas poor 
blacks could not. Middle-class blacks attended white public and private schools, whereas 
working-class black children did not. As the black middle-class gained urban leadership 
positions, such as Urban League President, City Councilman, Housing Committee 
Member, Vice Mayor, and State Senator, its racial connection to the working-class became 
weaker and more vulnerable to class division.122 
Rejection from black leadership, forced working-class leader Curtis Holt to align 
with annexed whites. In late 1970, Curtis Holt brought his case to Cabell Venable. The 
young white lawyer, who successfully defended the KKK just a few months prior, agreed 
to take the case to trial because this landmark case could, and ultimately did, propel his 
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legal career. Both Holt and annexed suburbanites shared similar interests. While Holt saw 
de-annexation as the means to acquire a city council seat, annexed residents saw de-
annexation as the means to return to Chesterfield. Because helping Holt could ultimately 
bring about a mutually beneficial result, suburban neighborhood organizations paid Holt’s 
legal fees. “We recognize the expense of litigation and are prepared to underwrite the 
cost…stating on behalf of the Councils, we want de-annexation,” declaired Arthur R. 
Cloey, head of two South Richmond suburban civic associations. Cabell and the suburban 
patrons supporting Holt’s case represented a political union between annexed whites and 
the black working-class leader. It was this strange partnership that fought tooth and nail to 
reverse the 1969 annexation.123  
Curtis Holt used Civil Rights legislation as a tool against the city council’s 
annexation. On February 24, 1971, Curtis Holt sued Richmond City in federal court over 
the 1969 annexation. Using Perkins v. Matthews as a precedent, Holt’s attorney requested 
the annulment of the 1969 annexation, an immediate election following the ruling, and the 
removal of Richmond’s right to annex. To Holt, the annexation’s influx of 47,000 white 
voters violated his Fourteenth and Fifteenth amendment rights protected under Section I of 
both amendments. Holt’s use of recent Civil Rights legislation illuminated his vision for 
post-Jim Crow Richmond. To Holt, post-Jim Crow Richmond was to have a black majority 
with working-class leadership within the council. No longer was power to be held by 
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affluent whites or black professional leadership. Rather, men such as he should assume 
leadership in a majority black city.124 
Holt’s case brought about a complex hybrid legal battle within two different 
locations. Because Holt included possible civil rights violations, the annexation was 
discussed on two fronts. In Washington, DC, the United States District Court of the District 
of Columbia was given the authority, under the VRA, to federally approve any annexation 
that placed the previous racial voting majority into the voting minority. Because the city 
council never submitted the annexation to the Washington Court for federal approval, the 
Justice Department, headed by Acting Assistant Attorney General David L. Normal, was 
charged with investigating the annexation and rendering its opinion to the Washington 
court. In Richmond, Judge Robert Merhige headed the Holt case. Judge Merhige was to 
rule on Holt based on the federal approval or disapproval of the 1969 annexation. Although 
Holt’s case was being argued in Richmond, the Justice Department’s assessment, and the 
Washington court’s annexation decision, determined whether Curtis Holt won or lost his 
class-action suit.125  
 The Justice Department’s initial reaction to the annexation empowered Curtis 
Holt’s case against the city. On May 7, 1971, Assistant U.S. Attorney General David L. 
Norman objected to the 1969 annexation because the city council neglected to seek federal 
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approval in 1969. Despite City Attorney Conrad B. Maddox Jr. requesting federal approval 
for the annexation based on its economic benefits, Holt’s attorney and annexed leaders 
Ronald Livingston and Roger Griffin argued that the annexation was used by the city 
council to disenfranchise urban blacks. Norman’s disapproval should have come as no 
surprise, given that Norman, unlike most President Richard Nixon supporters, was known 
for his sympathies for Civil Rights violations. This initial decision changed the game in 
Richmond. Holt’s case like his 1970 councilmanic candidacy, was seen originally as a 
failure waiting to happen. However, Norman’s federal objection to the annexation breathed 
life into Holt’s case, because federal disapproval could have led to Judge Merhige ruling 
in Curtis Holt’s favor.126  
Both the Justice Department and Judge Robert Merhige aided black and white 
leadership interest by refusing to de-annex the suburbs. After the city council voted seven-
to-two on implementing ward-style voting, the Justice Department found “no basis for 
withdrawing” their original objection. However, the annexation objection focused on 
voting, in that the new ward plans did not negate the obvious voting change the 1969 
annexation caused. Norman’s second objection did not mean the Washington Court would 
de-annex South Richmond, because Norman and the Washington Court favored 
“nonracially drawn councilmanic districts” not de-annexation. Similarly, on November 23, 
1971, Judge Merhige ruled in favor of Holt by acknowledging the annexation violated his 
Fourteenth and Fifteenth amendment rights. However, Judge Merhige, like Norman, 
refused to de-annex South Richmond. Both Curtis Holt and city officials received half of 
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what they wanted. Curtis Holt’s attorney proved city officials used their authority to strip 
working-class blacks of their civil rights as city officials kept annexed territories.127 
The U.S. District Court of the District of Columbia’s ruling on Petersburg, 
Virginia’s, annexation case foreshadowed its decision on Richmond. On October 18, 1972, 
the Washington Court approved Petersburg City’s annexation of Prince George County if 
“a ward system of electing its city councilmen” was implemented to reverse the new white 
majority from diluting the previous black majority vote. Like Richmond, Petersburg’s 
white leadership annexed a small portion of Prince George County, bringing in over nine 
thousand white voters to dilute the black vote from fifty-six percent to forty-seven percent. 
This ruling set the precedent for Richmond’s city council, as the Washington Court made 
it clear that Richmond’s annexation, for that matter any race-based annexation could stand 
if the voting style was changed. As Richmond’s case was moved up the docket, City 
Attorney Conrad Mattox and Holt Attorney Cabell Venable, as well as suburban leader 
Melvin Burnett understood that the continuous refusal to de-annex meant the annexation 
was more than likely going to stand.128 
Seeing Petersburg’s case as the example, Curtis Holt and his attorney believed city 
official’s proactive voting changes hurt the possibility for de-annexation. After much 
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infighting about the minutia of the ward proposals, on August 25, 1973, the city council, 
with Justice Department and Washington Court’s Chief Justice Skelly Wright’s approval, 
changed to ward-style voting. Richmond was divided into nine wards: four black wards 
(East End and Northside), four white wards (West End and Southside), and one swing vote 
or mixed ward (core). Holt and annexed residents lividly rejected the voting change as they 
believed the council was “us[ing] blacks as absolute fools.” Changing the voting strategy 
put city official’s one step closer to receiving federal approval on annexation. Rather, 
Curtis Holt and his attorney called for “black-white cooperation in the de-annexation case” 
because the “the voting rights of black citizens” were only restored if they were the city’s 
majority. Despite Holt and Venable’s opposition, the measure was passed and helped signal 
the end of Holt’s case against the city.129  
Despite the short gains made by the city council, Holt and the annexation wore 
down Richmond’s white leadership. After U.S. Magistrate Lawrence Margolis 
recommended the Washington and Richmond Court’s de-annex the suburbs, the 
Washington court issued a “no decision” on the annexation’s constitutionality, and Holt’s 
attorney filed two subsequent lawsuits against the city in the local court; three city 
councilmen resigned. The three exiting councilmen, William Daniel, Howard Carwile, and 
James Carpenter, all felt the city’s legal troubles were too much to handle, while running 
their own day-to-day affairs. Many believed that if the six remaining councilmen selected 
Curtis Holt, the city’s legal issues would end. Despite strong evidence supporting this 
suggestion, not one councilman placed his name into consideration. Instead, they chose 
two Team of Progress (TOP) supporters, Julius Johnson and Raymond Royall, along with 
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Crusade supporter Willie Dell. This move reflected the collective efforts of middle-class 
black and white elites to oppose Holt and his suburban patrons.130 
With the resignation of three councilmen, white leadership began a series of 
strategies preparing Richmond for its impending black leadership. The end was so close 
“they could smell it,” as white leaders systematically removed themselves and their 
business interest to the suburbs. First, the council allowed Amtrak to move to Henrico 
County. Although “federal legislation said it had to stay in town,” the council allowed 
Amtrak to build a suburban station on Staples Mill Road, signaling its transition to the 
suburbs. This removed income from city coffers. The city council set up the Marymount 
Park Foundation to allocate tax revenue to pay for its upkeep because they felt whenever 
“the black folks took over, they wouldn’t know how to take care of it.” The white council, 
through the Downtown Development Unlimited, set up a “bond reserve fund of about nine 
million a year out of its operating budget” to pay the city’s bond holders for infrastructural 
upkeep. White councilmen approved the creation of magnet schools that worked with 
Virginia Commonwealth University, University of Richmond, and Virginia Union 
University, to stimulate Richmond’s failing public education system. These measures were 
only a few in a series of ventures taken by white leadership to prepare the city for life 
without them.131 
In the midst of white leadership’s transition out of the city, the Washington Court 
affirmed the legitimacy of the annexation. After the Supreme Court heard and ruled in 
favor of City Attorney Mattox’s appeal to Margolis’s de-annexation recommendation, in 
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October of 1975, the Washington Court allowed city officials to retain the annexation if 
they could show “verifiable economic or administrative benefits” from the acquisition. City 
officials argued that Holt’s solution would financially bankrupt the city. De-annexation 
meant “rendering Richmond a vast ghetto…giving up $435 million worth of taxable 
property.” Likewise, the Crusade submitted an editorial to convince black residents that 
de-annexation only benefitted “white citizens in the annexed area…If black voters can 
obtain significant power in an expanded city, they will be able to direct city government so 
as to benefit both blacks and whites,” removing the financial troubles “within its old 
boundaries.” Holt’s attorney addressed the black and white elite partnership in the 
Washington Court. Cabell noted that urban blacks felt the financial burden of allocating 
public services to the suburbs. Venable also used race to argue that annexation support was 
“merely a second line defense of white supremacy and a first line defense of personally 
motivated black political bosses who insulate themselves in pocket boroughs.” Venable 
reasoned that the annexation was nothing more than black and white elites trying to prevent 
working-class “men like Curtis Holt from obtaining office.” Venable’s class and race-
centered argument against the annexation failed, as the federal court approved the 
annexation on August 9, 1976.132  
The federal ruling solidified black and white urban leadership political victory over 
Holt and the annexed suburbanites. Despite Venable’s objection to the federal court ruling, 
the annexation was rock solid by August 9, 1976. The publicity of Holt’s class-action suit 
was not enough to reverse the secret deal made by Phil Bagley and Irvin Horner in May of 
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1969. Curtis Holt and the annexed residents’ Civil Rights Era political coalition ended in 
defeat. Both agendas aligned on de-annexation and both agendas died on de-annexation. 
Despite the new ward system and notoriety he gained from opposing urban leadership, Holt 
never became a city councilman. Although annexed residents went as far as not paying 
local taxes during the trials, their residency remained within city limits.133 
Coming off of the Holt trials, Richmond was ripe for a racial shift in the city 
council. The first phase of Richmond’s post-Holt black political takeover was done through 
education. In 1976, Richard C. Hunter became Richmond’s first black school 
superintendent. With the 1977 election season heating up in December of 1976, it was a 
forgone conclusion that at least four blacks were winning council seats. The Justice 
Department forced the white city council to change from at-large to ward-style voting. 
Because blacks were the voting majority prior to the 1969 annexation, the new ward system 
placed more voting wards in black dominated districts. Four of the new nine districts were 
majority black, while one the swing district was over fifty percent black as well. After the 
Justice Department removed the ban on citywide elections on March 1, 1977, seven days 
later, Richmond elected its first majority black city council consisting of Crusade endorsees 
Henry Marsh III, Walter T. Kenney, Claudette McDaniel, Willie J. Dell, and “Bad Luck” 
Henry (Chuck) Richardson. The majority black council’s first action, signaling the racial 
shift the city and its council experienced in the last seventeen years, was their election of 
Henry Marsh III as Richmond’s first black mayor.   
Conclusion 
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The 1969 annexation, along with Bradley and Holt, simultaneously created political 
partnerships that would have never been dreamed of before 1970. While urban white 
officials worked with Bradley attorneys to desegregate city schools, annexed suburbanites 
and working-class blacks partnered in their objection to integrated schools. Likewise, black 
and white leadership collectively opposed Curtis Holt’s bid for urban power, while 
suburbanites, with attorney Cabell Venable, financially supported Holt’s political agenda 
to get their neighborhoods de-annexed from the city. The annexation, which tied both 
Bradley and Holt together, illuminated why race alone cannot explain Civil Rights Era 
Richmond. Complex political battles, secret dealings, and class-centered interest all 
influenced constituencies within both races to make allies where they could to achieve their 
desired result. A man like Curtis Holt, who was “shrewd and intelligent” was little more 
than an “embarrassment” to black leadership, yet he gained political support for his case 
across racial lines. White leadership, who wanted to maintain power over Richmond, 
aligned with black leaders, whom the opposed in urban elections, when challenged  by their 
suburban neighbors. Race can not alone explain Richmond’s Civil Rights Era urban 
politics.  
The truth is race, class, and geography culminated to create this complex Civil 
Rights Era drama. The use of race, class, and geography as political currency had limits 
however understanding how those limits intersect to create uncommon alliances, dictated 
the framework for understanding Civil Rights Era Richmond. Furthermore, as school 
desegregation and urban politics created Richmond’s black identity, the complex, 
agonizing, and controversial issues raised in the process will forever be the legacy left by 
Richmond’s Civil Rights Era.  
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Epilogue: Post-Civil Rights Richmond 
In the first two weeks after the 1977 councilmanic election, Marsh redefined the 
office of mayor. Marsh wanted to be the face of the city, rather than the figurehead elected 
by his friends on the city council. To establish his mayoral presence, Marsh removed the 
white city manager and replaced him with lesser known black bureaucrat Manual Deese. 
Before the 1977 election, the white majority council selected William J. Leidinger as city 
manager, hoping he would maintain affluent white business interest in City Hall. Marsh’s 
first course of action was requesting that City Manager Leidinger resign immediately. After 
the Richmond Business Community threatened to pull its support from Marsh, he and the 
four black councilmen all voted to remove Leidinger from office. This move by Marsh not 
only, as Moeser suggested, cemented the councilmanic power shift, it created a whole new 
battle between black councilmanic leadership and white business interest, a battle that 
black leaders ultimately lost.134  
The 1980s: Richmond Goes Broke 
First on council’s agenda was rebuilding Richmond’s economy. After the council 
removed Leidinger from his duties, the five black councilmen focused on easing white 
anxiety over the power shift. Henry Marsh III, like other black councilmen, received 
numerous death threats to his office and home. White hostility to the black council made 
every day “a battle” that was “just downright cut-throat.” The best way to ease white 
discontent was through redevelopment, something white residents and leadership favored 
throughout the 1960s and 70s. This redevelopment, however, included a revival of large 
retail stores in the downtown shopping district. The idea depended on large local retail 
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chains, Thalhimer’s and Miller & Rhodes, to anchor retail flight back to downtown 
Richmond. This plan, called Project One, was approved by the black majority council and 
former mayor Thomas Bliley, who represented what was left of Richmond’s white business 
leaders.135 
The black council’s economic redevelopment strategy failed. Although Phillip 
Morris, the city’s largest private sector employer, created 1,800 new jobs by 1980, many 
white business leaders refused to work with the black council. In 1981, the Hilton 
Corporation announced its plans to build a new hotel in the same business zone as Project 
One. If the hotel was built, it spelled the end of Project One’s biggest projected 
moneymakers, the hotel. To thwart The Hilton Corporation’s clear attempt to derail the 
black council’s version of urban redevelopment, the council developed and “passed a 
specific ordinance” preventing Hilton’s hotel construction. Eventually, the city council was 
sued and settled out of court, allowing Hilton to build its hotel. This move created a storm 
that the council could not control. Not only did it expose how the black council would use 
its power to achieve a self-serving end, it reminded residents that blacks controlled the 
council, but whites controlled the economic fate of the city.136  
The Hilton controversy highlighted the rivalry between black and white leaders. 
Despite Justin Moore, head of Richmond’s only electric company (VEPCO) helping to 
fund the Sixth Street Marketplace in 1985, affluent white leaders relocated their businesses 
to the suburbs. Men like Miller & Rhoads Department Store owner Thomas P. Bryan Jr., 
Universal Leaf Tobacco president Howard Cone, and head of First and Merchants National 
Bank Bruce Nolte all moved their business interests into Henrico and Chesterfield or sold 
                                                          
135 Campbell, Richmond’s Unhealed History, (Brandylane Publishers, Inc., 2011), 177-178.  
136 Campbell, Richmond’s Unhealed History, 180.  
113 
 
 
 
their businesses on the open market. In the midst of relocating, all of the men, with former 
City Manager William Leidinger, fought every zoning proposal and land deal with Henrico 
and Chesterfield Marsh and fellow council members suggested. While it appeared as 
political strife between former and new urban leadership, it is clear that post-Civil Rights 
Era political strife brought out Jim Crow Era racial tensions. Oliver Hill, former black city 
councilmen, suggested that “the real issue” was that “the Richmond newspapers and white 
citizens generally,” have “unending resistance” to the reality of Richmond’s black 
controlled city council.137 
Race and space defined Richmond’s black leaders’ poor working relationship with 
suburban leaders. Just as affluent whites battled with suburban leaders in the 1960s and 
1970s, post-Civil Rights Era black leaders fell victim to the same city-county political 
dichotomy. In the 1980s, suburbia attracted yet another constituency away from the city’s 
tax base: the black middle-class. Racial and class unity had limits, as middle-class blacks 
fled the city in search of the same suburban class-centred suburban lifestyle the silent 
majority chased throughout the 1960s and 1970s. As the urban housing market sunk and 
city schools became more impoverished, black porfesionals it “became about where you 
can buy a house or what school district you could afford to live in,” according to author 
Benjamin Campbell. It became clear that the black middle-class exacerbated its economic, 
political, and social potential in Richmond. As Chesterfield and Henrico gained a stronge 
black tax base, both leaderships refused to work with urban leadership on cooperative 
public projects like rebuilding schools, shared roads, maintaining public parks, and creating 
consolidated prison systems. In all, the urban-suburban political strife only intensified 
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when black leadership assumed the city council, as suburban economic power incentivized 
its leaders to not cooperate with black city officials.138  
State and federal powers ensured Richmond remained poverty-stricken under black 
leadership. By 1985, annexation laws, business relocation, and middle-class (black and 
white) flight depleted city coffers. City debt tripled that of Chesterfield and Henrico, as 
both counties were in their second stage of deindustrialized economic growth. Decreased 
revenue prevented city councilmen from obtaining bonding capacity to rebuild dated 
infrastructure and maintain municipal jobs. Although the city had a bond reserve fund of 
about nine million dollars, it was not enough to take out new loans and pay bondholders 
from the 1969 annexation, redevelopment projects from the mid-1960s, and the Sixth Street 
Marketplace in 1985. After the General Assembly refused to help, City Manager Manual 
Deese secured private funding for new bonding capacity however, bondholders only 
released funds to pay the city’s previous bond holders. This created a cycle of long-term 
debt, preventing any chance of economic stability. Adding insult to injury, the General 
Assembly and the Federal Highway Administration co-funded circumvential highways 
around Richmond. These highways, I-295 and Virginia State Route 288 cost over 1.1 
billion dollars and eliminated “the center city as a necessity” for suburbanites and corporate 
business interest. As state and federal powers hindered Richmond’s economic 
development, the city fell deeper into economic poverty.139 
The 1990s: Drugs and City Hall 
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 Throughout the 1990s, political corruption became the hallmark of Richmond’s city 
council. Henry (Chuck) Richardson, resigned in 1995 after being convicted of running an 
elaborate heroin operation out of the city council. Although Richardson fancied himself a 
“public relations consultant and real estate agent,” FBI investigations proved he was a 
lifelong heroin dealer and user who became a prominent member Richmond’s black elite 
without having a legal occupation. Richardson used his council seat to give municipal 
contracts to fellow drug dealers who laundered money through legitimate businesses. What 
made this resignation peculiar was the support Richardson received from the same 
community who knew of his illegal activities. Not only was Richardson a known heroin 
dealer, he was reelected four times after having “annual brushes with the law” over cocaine, 
heroin, and drunken driving charges. “He was our Robin Hood…they won’t let a good man 
serve us” said thirty-year-old single mother Karen Williams who, like many black 
Richmonders, saw Richardson as a man of the people, rather than the urban slum lord the 
1960s white media predicted would come to fruition with black leadership. Despite 
publicly swearing off drugs, after a 1988 cocaine incident landed him in drug rehab, 
Richardson landed back in jail several times, all while having the longest tenure on the 
council by 1996.140 
 Richardson’s reputation and antics only tarnished the legacy of the 1977 power 
shift. Throughout the 1990s, Councilman Richardson earned the name “Bad Luck Chuck,” 
as his run-ins with law enforcement placed a negative image upon himself and the black 
city council. Richardson’s last straw came on April 8, 2004, when police sergeant Anthony 
Franklin uncovered a marijuana lab, crack cocaine, and boxes of syringes at Richardson’s 
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home during a drug sweep. Although Richardson was acquitted because his son, Karl 
Richardson, confessed to running the marijuana and crack cocaine business, Chuck’s 
checkered past suggest he was always the brains of the operation. Chuck’s life was defined 
by drugs. Whether selling or using, Chuck was known throughout the city for his leadership 
over Richmond’s criminal underworld. As the council’s influence spiraled into obscurity, 
Chuck Richardson’s reputation became the symbol of corruption under which the black 
city council was remembered.141 
Many believed that Chuck Richardson’s demise, along with the image of black 
councilmanic leaderships, was no coincidence. Men like Henry Marsh, Howard Carwile, 
James Carpenter, and Walter T. Kenny, all left urban politics for state politics, national 
politics, or retirement by 1992. Although these men were remembered as Civil Rights Era 
leaders, they relied on men like Chuck Richardson to mobilize the working-class black 
voters that the black intelligencia lost touch with. As Civil Rights Era leaders transcended 
urban politics, some believe Richardson became expendable. Urban blacks believe 
Chuck’s misfortune was “revenge by the establishment” who had no use for a man with 
his checkered past. White and black leaders knew who Chuck was before his 1980s and 
1990s legal troubles, however, it was not until after his allies left city politics did he become 
a constant target by police. This could be speculation, yet the mood amongst thirty-to-sixty-
year-old blacks who remember Chuck is that he “stepped into a trap” once black politicians 
did not need neighborhood crime bosses to mobilize black voters anymore.142 
The 2000s: Public School Failure   
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 The early 2000s were defined by economic and racial re-segregation impacting 
public education. Public schools reflected how economic flight, black middle-class flight, 
and non-cooperation from surrounding counties impacted Richmond. After 1986, the city 
council removed cross-town busing and implemented school zones. This allowed West End 
whites to attend public school without fearing black influx. To keep the brightest black 
pupils from attending private schools, the council invested in charter schools, such as Open 
High School, Richmond Community, and Franklin Military Academy. Although these 
helped retain the brightest of the plus eighty-five percent black public school population, 
by 2010, state financial aid decreased due to low state test scores labeling Richmond 
schools as “failing” institutions not worth investment.  This resonated in Governor Robert 
McDonell 2011 removal of more than 5 million dollars from the city’s public school 
budget, making Richmond 10% of the state’s public education budget cut.143  
Today: My Experiences  
Just as Virginia Union University (VUU) inspired Richmond white-to-black 
transition in the 1960s, Virginia Commonwealth University (VCU) is the backbone of 
black-to-white gentrification. In the 1960s, VUU affiliates like Dr. William Thornton, 
Raymond Hilton, and Henry Marsh inspired the social unrest leading to Richmond’s black 
powershift. Today, VCU is undoing the Civil Rights Era racial transition through structural 
gentrification. As new libraries, educational buildings, condos, downtown businesses, 
athletic centers, and shopping malls are replacing old black business and residential 
districts. This gentrification is increasing Richmond’s white population. As of 2014, whites 
made up 44% of city residents. This rise from below 15% in the 90s came undoubtedly 
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from increased VCU enrollment and the capital investment VCU expansion inspired. Once 
the hotbed for white flight, Richmond is becoming one of the most sought after residential 
and business destinations for whites in the metropolitan area.144 
Growing up in the Richmond metropolitan area gave me a nuanced understanding 
of the racial system the transition created. Richmond’s racism is structural: with education 
and economics ensuring blacks have limited access to upward social mobility. While 
structural and systematic, race has its limits. Middle and upper-class black Richmonders 
survive structural racism by understanding and navigating around the racially coded 
barriers that blur the sources of black poverty. For example, high test scores in all-black 
public schools, or attending majority white private schools gives blacks access to 
universities, connections, job skills, and occupations that are not otherwise available. 
Blacks who access these tools understand that working with whites is the only way to 
convert their skills into wealth. Black business owners run their day-to-day affairs in black 
neighborhoods, yet the majority live in white suburbs and send their children to white 
private or public schools. The black community cannot create its own collective wealth 
because their middle-class professionals nor municipal government will invest into them 
as a whole. Rather, whoever can ascend from poverty, usually does so at the expense of 
the blacks surrounding them.  
Race is more of an issue now than it has ever been in the metropolitan area because 
it highlights insecurities over the results of the Civil Rights Era. Race in the metropolitian 
area cannot be addressed by either blacks or whites because racial discrimination was never 
resolved by Jim Crows’ demise. Despite VCU, the Virginia Historical Society, and the 
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University of Richmond (UR) numerous efforts to make race a part of the metropolitan 
history, most whites rather not discuss the topic. Parents of West End Richmond’s Glenn 
Allen High School complained that lessons about race are nothing more than using “white 
guilt” as a divisive topic. Race can only be divisive if it illuminates an active problem, yet 
this is accepted by white residents. Matthew Lassiter’s assessment of white collar racial 
innocence and suburban exclusion from race issues still exist today in the metropolitan 
area. It is difficult for whites to accept that their middle and upper-class lives exist at the 
expense of the blacks who were economically trapped in a decrepit inner-city just over fifty 
years ago.145  
In all, the Civil Rights Era hindered Richmond’s social growth. With Civil Rights 
legislation, Richmond had the potential to send shockwaves throughout the nation by being 
the first southern city to remove racial discrimination and discourse. The only way for the 
post-racial society to exist was through blacks and whites refusing to use race in the 
political, economic, educational, and social arena. Instead, both blacks and whites used 
race to obtain political power in the post-Jim Crow world. My own family refuse to let go 
of race when they were some of the middle-class blacks to flee to Chesterfield after the 
1977 election. Why didn’t the Civil Rights Era produce a racially blind Richmond? 
Because blacks and whites retained Jim Crow Era racial norms where the Civil Rights 
movement was felt the most. This created one of the most racially charged times in city 
history, as economics, education, and politics all centered on racial uncertainty. 
Nevertheless, blacks gained municipal control in Richmond, but it drove racial fears and 
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uncertainty past the point of reconciliation. This is why the Civil Rights Era failed to bring 
about a post-racial society in Richmond, Virginia.  
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